Subject: Re: About Iran’s Navy “At the Bottom of the Sea”
You're not describing what I'm talking about. You're describing insurgent warfare. I'm describing playing to American political opinion. They're not the same thing; a successful insurgent campaign can generate American political pressure as an outcome.

That's how these things work. The small, outgunned guerilla force engages in asymmetric warfare - which forces the larger invading country to expend vast amounts of resources (manpower, material, economic resources) without being able to actually "win" their strategic goals. And they do that until the domestic cost of maintaining that fight is too high. They choose to leave because the domestic political pressure forces them to do something they are not physically forced to do.

Same thing here. Iran's going to throttle the strait and precipitate one of the worst energy crises in history, together with shortages in fertilizer and helium and other goods that have to go through the strait.

Change the word "costly" to the phrase "...may be impossible". Much of Iran's oil fields are low pressure and they lack the tech to do much about it. Once they stop pumping - when they run out of storage - those wells may never restart. As to the "optimistic" part, that's a take for sure. Say, how much gasoline does Iran produce?

It's possible they never restart - but then again, this isn't the first time Iran's had to close down many of their wells, and they will likely close them down based upon their likely resilience. And then rotate among them. And if that doesn't work, then they'll have lost some of their wells.

Doesn't mean we get what we want. It means we've hurt them, perhaps permanently, but if they still resist we still don't get what we want. What happens if they keep resisting?

As to the "optimistic" part, that's a take for sure. Say, how much gasoline does Iran produce?

About 700 million barrels per day, as of last year. They have generally produced about 70% of consumption domestically, with the remainder being imported. However, the domestic gasoline market is heavily distorted by massive subsidies, which keep Iranian gasoline prices among the lowest in the world. The regime has resisted lowering those subsidies because it will be unpopular. Being invaded by a foreign power may give them the domestic cover they need to do that, get consumption matched to economic fundamentals, and rebalance consumption to domestic production - so we might expect that to happen in the near term.

But again, even if they start running short on gasoline, that still doesn't mean we get what we want. It means we've hurt them, but if they still resist, we still don't get what we want. What happens if they keep resisting?