Post New

TL;DR: It points to European structural problems.


https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/07/us-flattens-eu-b...

The trade deal on July 27 between America and the European Union was disastrous for Europe. The Financial Times described it as “the EU [succumbing] to Trump’s steamroller.” The deal sees the EU agree to a broad-based 15 per cent tariff on all goods exported to the US, except for steel and aluminium, which will see higher tariffs. The EU will also spend $250 billion (€214 billion) on American energy per year for the next three years. Europe also is dropping their own tariffs.

The deal is shockingly one-sided; the only thing the EU “got” was President Donald Trump not engaging in a trade war.

But while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen negotiated the deal, this truly is not her fault. The European Union is stuck in this situation – where they have to see NATO’s General Secretary (and former long-term Dutch prime minister) call Trump “Daddy” and then, weeks later, engage in a humiliating trade deal – because the EU is fundamentally not built for a multipolar world. Instead, it’s been stuck in what could be called its “Articles of Confederation” stage.

The "Articles of Confederation" is a clever nod to US history. And no, not the Confederacy.

It is long past time for Europe to realise what America’s leaders realised in the 1780s: multipolarity and Articles of Confederation-style governance don’t mix. They could seek to truly federalise the Union, but that would meet stern opposition from the variety of nationalistic countries who do not want their fates to be determined by Brussels.

Instead, they should consider the opposite: Devolution of powers back to the states. Let the “Union” exist as a project for travel and trade, but end attempts to shape social policies – such as, in the midst of geopolitical uncertainty, taking the time to hector Budapest on Pride Month. End the attempts to form illogical pan-continental defence agreements, too. Allow blocs to form, for example, an eastern European bloc of Poland and the Baltics, armed to the teeth, one which can determine its own policies without being tied down to what Spain wants.

The EU, as currently constituted, cannot and will not be able to act as an independent power, much less as a pole, in multipolarity. It must change.

The EU, as currently constituted, cannot and will not be able to act as an independent power, much less as a pole, in multipolarity. It must change.

Except they probably don't want that.

When the U.S. switched from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, it basically switched from being a collection of independent countries that had a tight military and economic agreement to becoming one country. The States retained part of their sovereignty, which is part of why the U.S. operates so differently from other countries. But we went from something very much like a modern EU/NATO arrangement into a single national state.

Europe isn't likely to ever take that step. For a time, it was a belief among One World Order conspiracists and the like that the European Common Market --> European Union --> Adoption of Euro as currency would eventually lead to a single European country, as a precursor to forcing all the world's nations to merge into a single World Government. But while the ECM --> EU --> Eurozone has led to much greater economic integration, it hasn't really promoted anything close to the integration you saw with other national integration projects back in the day (the U.S., the unifications of Germany and Italy in the late 19th Century, etc.). Folks seem to like having some degree of correspondence between the "People" they belong to and national borders, and the Germans and French and Spaniards etc. don't appear to have any great desire to all be living in a single country the way that the early New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians and Virginians were willing to do back in 1789.

Europe isn't likely to ever take that step. For a time, it was a belief among One World Order conspiracists and the like that the European Common Market --> European Union --> Adoption of Euro as currency would eventually lead to a single European country, as a precursor to forcing all the world's nations to merge into a single World Government. But while the ECM --> EU --> Eurozone has led to much greater economic integration, it hasn't really promoted anything close to the integration you saw with other national integration projects back in the day (the U.S., the unifications of Germany and Italy in the late 19th Century, etc.). Folks seem to like having some degree of correspondence between the "People" they belong to and national borders, and the Germans and French and Spaniards etc. don't appear to have any great desire to all be living in a single country the way that the early New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians and Virginians were willing to do back in 1789.


The op-ed basically makes this point. There's no way that some European countries are going to set aside their national identities and subsume it towards a greater Europe. Not gonna happen.

Instead it argues the opposite - scale back the reach that Brussels has to just trade and travel policy, leaving other countries free to pursue their own defense policies. You'd see an Eastern group of European countries (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, the Baltics) pursue aggressive defense policies while other outfits like Spain kinda just sit there.

Instead it argues the opposite - scale back the reach that Brussels has to just trade and travel policy, leaving other countries free to pursue their own defense policies. You'd see an Eastern group of European countries (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, the Baltics) pursue aggressive defense policies while other outfits like Spain kinda just sit there.

I think that's unlikely, also. Remember, even the original Articles had some degree of coordinated military defense. There's a major free-rider problem - Poland probably doesn't want Spain to be able to get the benefit of their military expenditures, which block continental invasions from the east). There's also collective action problem - the Great European Plain is the "roadway" for land forces to get into Europe from the east, and so you need all of the countries that sit on that plain to be heavily militarized in order to provide an effective defense. There's significant reasons why Europe would want to maintain tight integration of national defense institutions and policies.

Plus, there's the pretty significant problem of what happens when you eliminate common defense systems and go back to having more nationalized armies again. Remember, many of the world's most terrible wars didn't result from Europe being invaded from without, but from wars between European countries. This is the "be careful what you wish for" scenario. The Pax Americana arose because Europe was under the massively powerful umbrella of the U.S. military....but it also existed in part because European armed forces were generally weak and subject mostly to NATO oversight. Getting Europe to vastly increase its own defense operations isn't an entirely unmitigated good, because you increase the chances of going back to the Bad Old Days of wars within Europe.

There's a major free-rider problem - Poland probably doesn't want Spain to be able to get the benefit of their military expenditures, which block continental invasions from the east). There's also collective action problem - the Great European Plain is the "roadway" for land forces to get into Europe from the east, and so you need all of the countries that sit on that plain to be heavily militarized in order to provide an effective defense. There's significant reasons why Europe would want to maintain tight integration of national defense institutions and policies.

And this is their exact problem today- in many respects the entire EU is free riding off the US (and has been for decades now). Within the continent the Spainards (the furthest from Russia with limited world war exposure in their history) have little desire to fund a national defense whereas on the other side you have a Poland (sits on Putin's border and has a long history of being run over from both the east and the west) with the polar opposite view.

The Pax Americana arose because Europe was under the massively powerful umbrella of the U.S. military....but it also existed in part because European armed forces were generally weak and subject mostly to NATO oversight. Getting Europe to vastly increase its own defense operations isn't an entirely unmitigated good, because you increase the chances of going back to the Bad Old Days of wars within Europe.

And this brings us around to the trade deal. Avoidance of that is fine in concept, but only if the Europeans have some skin in the game. Since the reunification of Germany, they largely haven't. NATO navies are at all-time lows. The Germans can field maybe ~80 combat ready aircraft and that's probably a very generous estimate:

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski likes to relate a humorous moment from a NATO event that occurred during the 2013-2019 tenure of Dr. Ursula von der Leyen as head of Germany’s MoD. One of his German colleagues took him aside and pointed across the room to the CDU politician and told him:

“Do you see that woman over there,” asked his German colleague. “That’s our defense minister. She has more children than the Luftwaffe currently have serviceable aircraft.”
(from https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-numbers-pr...)

If the Europeans don't want to fund their own defense in traditional ways, they can buy our hardware instead. I'm good with that.

...but it also existed in part because European armed forces were generally weak and subject mostly to NATO oversight.

That was huge, yes. As I recall from my Civil War history, one of the issues the Confederacy had was that each state was almost its own nation. As such, they were often more concerned about their own state's defense, and the Confederate Army had issues getting everything it needed. There were also other issues (e.g. not much heavy industry in the South), but that was one of them.

Europe with NATO would be at a distinct disadvantage if attacked by Putin (once he ends his idiotic war with Ukraine, and rebuilds...which will take a while). With NATO, Putin would be crushed in a conventional conflict.

We did have a war within Europe during my lifetime. The Balkans. That was a mess. Ancient ethnic hatreds.

And this is their exact problem today- in many respects the entire EU is free riding off the US (and has been for decades now). Within the continent the Spainards (the furthest from Russia with limited world war exposure in their history) have little desire to fund a national defense whereas on the other side you have a Poland (sits on Putin's border and has a long history of being run over from both the east and the west) with the polar opposite view.

But that problem is addressed by having tightly integrated EU defense forces (via NATO). Loosening defense coordination makes that problem worse, not better.

The US did provide a very large proportion of the defense "umbrella" over Europe, but it's not entirely accurate to call that "free riding" - because we got some very important things out of it. Primarily, we got to have an outsized voice in European (and indeed global) security decisions, letting us call the shots on a host of matters and have an influential voice on others. And secondarily, we got the Pax Americana - no wars in Europe for a good 80 years or so. Not bad, considering that European wars cost Americans a lot more lives (and treasure) than any foreign attack against us. There's a very good argument that we're vastly better off paying for Europe's continental defense, since it keeps them weak and us strong and in control of the continent.

And secondarily, we got the Pax Americana - no wars in Europe for a good 80 years or so. Not bad, considering that European wars cost Americans a lot more lives (and treasure) than any foreign attack against us. There's a very good argument that we're vastly better off paying for Europe's continental defense, since it keeps them weak and us strong and in control of the continent.

Yes, and while I was growing up - no one wanted an armed Germany, an armed Germany would have been anathema to those demographics that are now MAGA. Germany was a free rider? Really?

I do think they like it this way. I remember seeing a serious but humorous map of what Euro countries think of each other and it was enlightening how many of them think the others are a bunch of dirty immoral lazy stinky pedophiles. And they have histories going waay back.

But that problem is addressed by having tightly integrated EU defense forces (via NATO). Loosening defense coordination makes that problem worse, not better.

Not necessarily. Currently nations like Spain are more or less refusing to re-arm.

The US did provide a very large proportion of the defense "umbrella" over Europe, but it's not entirely accurate to call that "free riding" - because we got some very important things out of it. Primarily, we got to have an outsized voice in European (and indeed global) security decisions, letting us call the shots on a host of matters and have an influential voice on others. And secondarily, we got the Pax Americana - no wars in Europe for a good 80 years or so. Not bad, considering that European wars cost Americans a lot more lives (and treasure) than any foreign attack against us. There's a very good argument that we're vastly better off paying for Europe's continental defense, since it keeps them weak and us strong and in control of the continent.

1. Outsized voice in European security decisions
It's important to break this up into 2 time periods: a) Cold War and b) Post Cold War.
Pre-Cold war, sure. The US - at the cost of rebuilding the entire economy of post WW2 Europe, the construction of several facilities and the stationing of hundreds of thousands of American troops in Europe, the US got to significantly influence European security strategy. Note that Europe's and America's interests were 100% aligned, so it's not like we were making them do anything they didn't want to do.

Post Cold War. A few US Presidents noted the decline in Europe's defense posture, defense spending, and overall reduction in capabilities. Germany/France/UK all saw their military capabilities and deployable forces shrink to a FRACTION of their Cold War levels. Rather than treating Russia as a rival or strategy adversary, Europe began tethering its energy needs to Russia going so far as to put Putin in a position of being able to dictate energy terms to the continental powers. Instead of being able to handle what amounted to a relatively small peacekeeping operation in the Balkans the USA was forced to commit significant airpower and resources to quell a conflict in Europe's back yard. Rather than pivoting NATO to deter an increasingly aggressive and powerful China, European nations like Italy started to sign on with China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The US kept merrily spending as if the Cold War was still a thing while the Europeans allowed their forces ti wither.

So yes. It's 100% accurate to call it free riding post ~1989.

There's a very good argument that we're vastly better off paying for Europe's continental defense, since it keeps them weak and us strong and in control of the continent.

I think you're underestimating that amount of investment the Euros need to make merely to return to end of Cold War levels.

Key Points and Summary: Germany’s military readiness has long been a weak spot in NATO, with low defense spending and slow procurement cycles. A 2023 report from the Kiel Institute estimates that at current production rates, it would take until 2066 to restore the Luftwaffe’s 2004 combat aircraft levels and until 2121 for artillery.

That's not even back to their Cold War levels. That's just to get them back to 2004.

The Texas Guard by itself could maybe start in Normandy and probably defeat most of Europe by itself.

Most of Europe's militaries aren't merely "weak". They just don't exist anymore.

Quiz for you. How many deployable frigates and destroyers does the Royal Navy have today vs. 1990?
The answer is 51 (1990) vs. 19 today.

The US kept merrily spending as if the Cold War was still a thing while the Europeans allowed their forces ti wither.

So yes. It's 100% accurate to call it free riding post ~1989.

Oh, no question we took on the massive amount of providing defense Europe, both during and after the Cold War. My questioning whether one could call it "free riding" is based not on the relative proportion of expenditures, but rather on the quid pro quo that the U.S. got out of it. Europe got much of its defense provided by a country on the other side of the world....but the U.S. got to be in charge of Europe militarily and assume the mantle of the Leaders of the Free World. That's different than the normal free rider situation, like someone picking up the trash on a road by themselves that everyone else uses. The U.S. got an enormous strategic benefit from this exchange. We got to decide the state of military affairs for an entire continent, and one that had cause the U.S. massive losses twice in the prior three decades - and to decide policy and priorities during the Cold War.

The Texas Guard by itself could maybe start in Normandy and probably defeat most of Europe by itself.

Most of Europe's militaries aren't merely "weak". They just don't exist anymore.

As we've discussed before, this is entirely false. The Texas Guard has about 23,000 service members in all branches. Just the army of just France has about 120,000 service members during peacetime. They'd never get off the beaches.

Whenever these conversations come up, you always focus on equipment and material - especially planes and naval forces. But that's not where Europe's "domestic" military resources have been allocated. They've concentrated mostly on infantry and ground units. Because things like fighter jets and military ships are very mobile, so they can be moved into and around the Continental theater very easily. So because European military strategy is oriented towards working with the U.S. (which would be expected to dominate the air and the seas in response to any invasion), the European military is mostly ground forces.

That's why there are about 85,000 U.S. troops in all branches in Europe - and there's about 200,000 troops in the Greek Army alone. We have vastly more equipment than they do; they have vastly more troops.

We could change that, of course. We could get Europe to stop relying on U.S. air power and naval power, and be in a position to stand on their own in defending against a Continental invasion. But the cost of that is that we would have to cede our absolute air and naval superiority over to the countries of Europe. Which would have negative consequences for our national security. Right now, the U.S. could conquer Europe (the Texas national guard couldn't, but the entire U.S. military could) - and everyone knows that. Which imposes a certain....."standard of behavior" on the military relations between countries like Germany and France, which have historically had some "dust-ups" from time to time. If we choose to walk away from that, we certainly can spend less on equipment in Europe, but there is a price associated with that.....

We could get Europe to stop relying on U.S. air power and naval power, and be in a position to stand on their own in defending against a Continental invasion. But the cost of that is that we would have to cede our absolute air and naval superiority over to the countries of Europe.

See my previous post. Europe's most industrialized country at present course and speed can't get back to its 2004 levels in artillery for nearly 100 years. Think about that.

If we choose to walk away from that, we certainly can spend less on equipment in Europe, but there is a price associated with that.....

The France and Germany of today aren't our Grandfather's Frances and Germanys. Neither has a colonial presence, not that the world would accept that.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1334182/wwii-p...

In 1938 the US was #1 with a GDP of $800 billion. Next up was UK with a total of $683B spread among the UK itself, their colonies and British dominion nations like Canada (it's fair to add them all up since they all were working for The Crown). Germany was 4th in the world (just less than half the US) and France was 6th (4x smaller than the US).

Today, the US is still #1. Germany's economy is now 1/6th of ours and France's is 9x smaller. Relative to us they've been moving backwards, a function of the general retrenchment of both to becoming social welfare states (despite Germany's relative strengths in exports).

They can't afford to arm up and conquer anything. The *best* they can do is put a shotgun by the door and try to keep The Bear at bay (and even The Bear needs significant help from The Dragon).

There's a very good argument that we're vastly better off paying for Europe's continental defense, since it keeps them weak and us strong and in control of the continent.

Oh! He said that part out loud!

So much for American altruism. ;-)

You are, of course, correct. Helping Europe was putting America First in many ways. And, in a war, NATO would have kept the Rooskies occupied in Europe, rather than rolling them over, and it coming to our doorstep. Yeah, I still remember how to think like a Cold Warrior (I was raised in the Cold War).

Getting Europe to vastly increase its own defense operations isn't an entirely unmitigated good, because you increase the chances of going back to the Bad Old Days of wars within Europe.

A sad reality of human existence- when the old generation and its collective memory disappears, the next generation seems bent on having to learn those lessons all over again.

Yeah- the lessons are written in history books, but with our modern minds, “we” know better.

A sad reality of human existence- when the old generation and its collective memory disappears, the next generation seems bent on having to learn those lessons all over again.

Yeah- the lessons are written in history books, but with our modern minds, “we” know better.

No, the math knows better. They not only lack the dollars and the industrial capability, they also lack the political will.

Let's put it this way. Putin's been doing every boogeyman thing every European Cold Warrior said the Russians would do for 44 years from 1945 to 1989. What's the continental response been?

A Gallic shrug. If that.

See my previous post. Europe's most industrialized country at present course and speed can't get back to its 2004 levels in artillery for nearly 100 years. Think about that.

At present course, sure. But if they really put their resources into it, they could do it much, much more quickly. You know this. They don't have many factories making artillery shells today, because they don't need to have many factories making artillery shells. Which makes sense.

They can't afford to arm up and conquer anything.

It's not like any nation that might invade Europe has similarly kept pace with the U.S. - so they could, if they wanted to, ramp up their defensive capabilities sufficient to repel an invading force from, say, Russia.

But again, the downside to that is that they then all have armies that are sufficient to conquer each other. So we've had eight decades of uninterrupted peace between the countries of Europe; something which had never heretofore existed. Ever. And a huge part of that is the Pax Americana, the restructuring of European defense forces to be pieces of a military defense against invasion from the East, rather than wholly self-sufficient armed forces that are powerful enough to flex beyond their borders.

We're too cheap to pay for that Pax Americana now, apparently. Basically having military control of Europe isn't something we're interested in much any more. I think we'll come to regret that, and that our military expenditures there will look cheap at twice the cost if we see intra-European military conflicts make a comeback. It's too much trouble to be the Boss of NATO, and once we force all the other countries of Europe to step up their defense funding, they might start to question why the US is the Boss of NATO anymore.

Let's put it this way. Putin's been doing every boogeyman thing every European Cold Warrior said the Russians would do for 44 years from 1945 to 1989. What's the continental response been?

To make sure that their bargain with the U.S. - we supply a huge part of the defense in exchange for being in charge of Europe's military theater - holds up. Which is the smart thing for them to do.

If we break that bargain, as we seem to be doing? We'll get to stop providing a huge part of their defense, but then they'll develop their own full-bore military capacity, and almost certainly stop letting us be in charge of Europe's military theater going forward. Which....seems like a bad thing for us?

At present course, sure. But if they really put their resources into it, they could do it much, much more quickly. You know this. They don't have many factories making artillery shells today, because they don't need to have many factories making artillery shells. Which makes sense.

There is zero, actually less than zero, among European voters or politicians to commit resources towards conquering the continent. They'd have to sacrifice their social safety nets and lavish early retirements for that.

They won't.

But again, the downside to that is that they then all have armies that are sufficient to conquer each other. So we've had eight decades of uninterrupted peace between the countries of Europe; something which had never heretofore existed. Ever. And a huge part of that is the Pax Americana, the restructuring of European defense forces to be pieces of a military defense against invasion from the East, rather than wholly self-sufficient armed forces that are powerful enough to flex beyond their borders.

You don't think the collective memory of "twice is enough" is also present? Travel through Europe and you'll see reminders of both World Wars everywhere. They don't want to go there again.

We're too cheap to pay for that Pax Americana now, apparently.

Oh? We're currently at 3.4% of our (much larger) GDP. We also need to pivot to the Pacific urgently and defend significant assets in outer space. We've allowed our

-Front line Navy
-Shipbuilding
-Logistical support
-Support bases

...to deteriorate to the point of useless in some ways. That needs to be fixed, pronto. It means more hulls put in the water every year, a crash buildout of the F-47 and B-21, more air-to-air missiles, and even more importantly rebuilding the ability to do simple things like ship gas and beans across the Pacific.

Too cheap? No. We just have to have slightly different priorities for the next couple of decades.

It's too much trouble to be the Boss of NATO, and once we force all the other countries of Europe to step up their defense funding, they might start to question why the US is the Boss of NATO anymore.

The Russians aren't going to be charging through the Fulda Gap behind a wall of tanks any time soon. Arguing that the defense of Europe is the #1 priority of the national security of the United States was the correct philosophy of oh, 1949-1989 but not as much now.

It's not a massive ask to ask Gerhard, Nigel, Giuseppe and Francois over in Europe to spend a few more bucks a year in their own self interest.

Bringing this back to the EU trade deal - one of its more brilliant provisions was having the Europeans buy more American hardware. If they don't want to fund their own defense they can directly pay us to do it.

To make sure that their bargain with the U.S. - we supply a huge part of the defense in exchange for being in charge of Europe's military theater - holds up. Which is the smart thing for them to do.

Of course it is. We pay the bills and all they have to do is generously provide a couple of acres here and there for US troops to hang out. What's not to love?

If we break that bargain, as we seem to be doing? How are we in any way breaking that bargain?

We'll get to stop providing a huge part of their defense, but then they'll develop their own full-bore military capacity, and almost certainly stop letting us be in charge of Europe's military theater going forward. Which....seems like a bad thing for us?

They don't have the bucks or the political will for that.

Do you really see Germany suddenly rearming and goose stepping across Europe in the next 100 years?

As we've discussed before, this is entirely false. The Texas Guard has about 23,000 service members in all branches. Just the army of just France has about 120,000 service members during peacetime. They'd never get off the beaches.

They'd never get on the beaches. The French have a navy and an air force. TX has neither. But if they somehow managed to get there, they'd be slaughtered.

Plus, France has some really good special ops people.

But that's not where Europe's "domestic" military resources have been allocated. They've concentrated mostly on infantry and ground units. Because things like fighter jets and military ships are very mobile, so they can be moved into and around the Continental theater very easily. So because European military strategy is oriented towards working with the U.S. (which would be expected to dominate the air and the seas in response to any invasion), the European military is mostly ground forces.

Correct again. Air forces and navies are mobile. But also not really as relevant to a ground war in Europe. They need tanks and infantry, and all the associated toys. As we're seeing in Ukraine, having an air force within "striking distance" is a good way to not have an air force for very long. The Ukrainians have done enormous damage, and most of it wasn't their air force doing it. They don't even have a navy, and have wreaked havoc with the Russian navy.

Any war in Europe will be a land war. Unless you have devastating superiority (which the US has wherever they go), air forces probably won't come into play that much. You'll need infantry, including "drone units" after what we've witnessed in Ukraine. For all the new tech, Ukraine is largely being fought WWI style...trenches, bunkers, minefields and obstacles. Only occasionally is there much motion in either direction.

Bringing this back to the EU trade deal - one of its more brilliant provisions was having the Europeans buy more American hardware. If they don't want to fund their own defense they can directly pay us to do it.

One of it's more useless "provisions" was having the European Commission handwave towards buying more American hardware, even though they made no formal commitment to do so and would have no authority to make such a commitment anyway, as military purchases are a decision made by country states and not by the EU:

https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-defen...

But it's brilliant in terms of its political benefit to Trump, who benefits from his supporters believing that this means that the Europeans will buy more US hardware (even though that's not the case).

In fact, as noted in that article, it's probably the opposite that's going to happen. Since Trump has been telling Europe that the U.S. is no longer interested in providing as much of their defense umbrella, all those country states are now prioritizing domestic military purchases. They're beefing up their defense spending, and if the U.S. is now going to be an inconstant partner they don't want that extra defense spending going to us. So they're prioritizing expanding their domestic military manufacturing capacity - the thing that you've said they weren't going to consider doing.

One of it's more useless "provisions" was having the European Commission handwave towards buying more American hardware, even though they made no formal commitment to do so and would have no authority to make such a commitment anyway, as military purchases are a decision made by country states and not by the EU:

It only becomes "useless" unless Trump can't strike deals with individual countries, doesn't it?

Since Trump has been telling Europe that the U.S. is no longer interested in providing as much of their defense umbrella, all those country states are now prioritizing domestic military purchases.

And one more time. That's great for them to say, but it's going to take the Germans 100 years to build something as simple as artillery pieces. That's in the Come on, man bucket.

We pay the bills and all they have to do is generously provide a couple of acres here and there for US troops to hang out. What's not to love?

Yeah - because military bases that allow us to project power and control the military theater throughout continental Europe are just "a couple of acres here and there for US troops to hang out." That's why we cared so much about the Chagos Islands military facility, right? It was just a "couple of acres" to let troops hang out in?

They don't have the bucks or the political will for that.

They're already starting to do that. Across Europe, one response to Trump's insistence on their increasing defense spending and signaling that the US isn't interested in being the Boss of Europe's military theater any more is that all those countries are prioritizing increasing their domestic military defense manufacturing capacity. Some of that incremental spending will go to the U.S., to be sure - but most of the nations that are increasing their military budgets are sharply prioritizing domestic military capacity and building up their defense industries, not just their budgets.

What, did you think that we could insist that they need to spend more on defense and stand on their own and not count on the U.S. to have their back, and they wouldn't take that to heart and do it in a way that actually lets them stand on their own?

That's great for them to say, but it's going to take the Germans 100 years to build something as simple as artillery pieces. That's in the Come on, man bucket.

Why would it take them 100 years to do that?

If the German government placed an order to have a munitions and artillery factory built, why would it take 100 years for that to happen?

Yeah - because military bases that allow us to project power and control the military theater throughout continental Europe are just "a couple of acres here and there for US troops to hang out." That's why we cared so much about the Chagos Islands military facility, right? It was just a "couple of acres" to let troops hang out in?

Let me know how basing aircraft carriers in the port of say, Kiel helps out with deterring China in the Pacific.

Across Europe, one response to Trump's insistence on their increasing defense spending and signaling that the US isn't interested in being the Boss of Europe's military theater any more is that all those countries are prioritizing increasing their domestic military defense manufacturing capacity.

Uh, huh. And it's going to take the Germans 100 years to replace their artillery from 2004.

What, did you think that we could insist that they need to spend more on defense and stand on their own and not count on the U.S. to have their back, and they wouldn't take that to heart and do it in a way that actually lets them stand on their own?

I don't think you quite are coming to grips with today's European pol vs. the ones from even 20 years ago. This new bunch is more apt to throw their borders open and kneecap their domestic energy production than they are to defend anything.

How do you think Europe came to be even partially dependent on Russia for energy in the first place?

Why would it take them 100 years to do that?

Because Germany's economy is lopsidedly export driven. Its currency for years has been artificially inflated by many other European outfits. Its energy policy has been one of reduction to a more agrarian posture, not in the direction of industrial powerhouse.

They're a mass of contradictions, and none of them are easily unwound.

If the German government placed an order to have a munitions and artillery factory built, why would it take 100 years for that to happen?

Lol. Have you followed German efforts in their energy sector?

https://www.politico.eu/article/nuclear-reactors-g...
Berlin has agreed to spend €16 billion to build four major natural gas plants to meet electricity demand in a major overhaul of the country's energy grid. (From 2/5/24)

We be buildin' gas plants, yessir!

https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/germany...
While Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government pledged to pursue an early exit from coal — the country’s legal deadline isn’t until 2038 — the endeavor was dealt a blow this week when officials gave up on a draft law for the construction of new gas plants. The measure couldn’t be voted on after Germany’s three-party coalition collapsed last month, the Economy Ministry said.

auf Wiedersehen, gas plants!

...but we're back on, baby!
https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy...

The new German coalition government has announced a pact to strengthen the country in face of growing global political tensions. Within the energy sector, the government intends to lower electricity prices by at least 5 cents by cutting the electricity tax to the European minimum, cut grid fees and introduce an industrial electricity price. In addition, the government plans to build up to 20 GW of gas power plant capacity by 2030 and to create the framework to allow the installation of CCS technology, including for gas-fired power plants.

...and all of this is in the context of Putin's invasion of the Ukraine and crisis that it represents (and that your argument is built on top of).

Let me know how basing aircraft carriers in the port of say, Kiel helps out with deterring China in the Pacific.

China's in a different theater. You were very much aware of the fact that foreign military bases are extraordinarily useful in projecting power into those regions, so I don't accept that you really believe your dismissive labelling of our bases in Europe as being no more than a few acres for troops to "hang out" in. Our bases in the continent basically give us a massive ability to project power across the European theater and into the Middle East....and I think you know that.

Uh, huh. And it's going to take the Germans 100 years to replace their artillery from 2004.

No, it won't. It would take them 100 years at prior rates. But they're not going to stick to prior rates, are they? We've forced them to close-to-double their defense spending....and they're going to plow all that extra money into their domestic military capabilities.

I don't think you quite are coming to grips with today's European pol vs. the ones from even 20 years ago. This new bunch is more apt to throw their borders open and kneecap their domestic energy production than they are to defend anything.

You keep saying that, but the response of all of these countries has been to sharply ramp up their domestic military defense expenditures and manufacturing capabilities. Having forced "today's European pol" to significantly increase their defense spending, it's no surprise that they're going to spend that money at home rather than send it to the U.S.

How do you think Europe came to be even partially dependent on Russia for energy in the first place?

The same way we came to be so dependent on Taiwan for chips and China for rare earths. Russia is a cheap, well-supplied, and geographically convenient source of that resource, which is a vital input to lots of manufacturing and other processes that promote economic growth. If you have a free market economy, then a lot of your market participants end up sourcing their factors of production to the cheapest dependable source of that factor of production.

They also believed - as we did for a long time - that increased economic ties to a rival nation is a way of dialing down the threat profile of that nation, as it markedly increases the costs to them of hostile action against you. That's what Trump is counting on with China, right - that because their economy requires access to U.S. markets they have to bend the knee, because they can't afford to just have that be cut off?

So, yes - now that the world has changed in a non-trivial way, Europe is reconfiguring its energy supply. But it made a ton of sense for them to get cheap and available energy from Russia during the post-Cold War era, when it was widely expected that fostering those economic ties would be more likely to bring Russia into the Western way of thinking.

Because Germany's economy is lopsidedly export driven.

So? That still doesn't explain why they couldn't build a munitions factor - or several - if they were pressed to. Certainly not that it would take one hundred years for them to do it.

To borrow your phrase, come on. We're concerned (correctly) that a economically crippled country like Iran can put together the facilities necessary to build nuclear weapons, and you're claiming that an advanced western economy like Germany couldn't manage to build conventional military equipment for 100 years? That's just ridiculous.

Have you followed German efforts in their energy sector?

Yes - and I'm not sure why that helps your argument. Their efforts in the energy sector, as documented in the articles that you yourself linked, show that the German "pols" are perfectly capable of re-prioritizing an industrial sector when needs must. With Russian gas unavailable, they're plowing ahead with domestic fossil fuel production again. Policies change. You can't extrapolate a rate of production that existed before the change of policies. No mention in your articles that it will take them a century to build some new gas plants.

China's in a different theater. You were very much aware of the fact that foreign military bases are extraordinarily useful in projecting power into those regions, so I don't accept that you really believe your dismissive labelling of our bases in Europe as being no more than a few acres for troops to "hang out" in. Our bases in the continent basically give us a massive ability to project power across the European theater and into the Middle East....and I think you know that.

Of course they do.
But new investments need to be made to reorient towards the most pressing threat axis, and that's China. There's no need to maintain fleets of airplanes and tens of thousands of troops on continentnal Europe when the need is in the Pacific theater. That's the point.

The US' Cold War philosophy was to maintain a WW2-style military capable of a "two front war" in the same vein that we were able to deal with Germany and Japan simultaneously. The problem is, that's always been a fantasy.

We have our own shortage of dollars due to our own social structure and as such we don't have the ability to build a 400 ship Navy and completely own Europe's defense at the same time.

Let's put it this way. To get back to Reagan-era levels of defense spending (~6% of GDP, about DOUBLE what it is today) we would need significant cuts in Medicare/Medicaid spending. Are you down for that? Medicare is currently 17.6% of GDP.

You keep saying that, but the response of all of these countries has been to sharply ramp up their domestic military defense expenditures and manufacturing capabilities.

Have they, now.
The Germans are expecting a massive haul of 105 new Leopard tanks. For a new forward brigade to be deployed on Russia's doorstep in Lithuania!

When, you ask? They expect to be ready by 2030. That's rocket-ship stuff.

So?

So? See all the contradictions that is the German economy.

That still doesn't explain why they couldn't build a munitions factor - or several - if they were pressed to. Certainly not that it would take one hundred years for them to do it.

And yet, in the face of the worst case nightmare of a full-fledged Russian invasion right up to a NATO border, what have they done?

As in, *really* done? Very little.

Yes - and I'm not sure why that helps your argument.

It shows that even the face of imminent national need...they can't act decisively.

Have they, now.
The Germans are expecting a massive haul of 105 new Leopard tanks. For a new forward brigade to be deployed on Russia's doorstep in Lithuania!

When, you ask? They expect to be ready by 2030. That's rocket-ship stuff.

I went to law school so I wouldn't have to do math, but that certainly seems to me like a lot less than 100 years. That's a lot of tanks - their entire inventory right now is only about 300 tanks. And building tanks is probably a bit more complicated than artillery or ordinance. So it seems to me that if Germany can increase their entire tank inventory by a third in about five years, they should be able to manage increasing their artillery supply in less than a century, if pressed.

BTW...how long do you believe it would take other countries to build that many tanks, from initial order to deployment? 'Cause while five years might be a bit on the long side....it might just be normal. How long do you think it takes the U.S. to build new tanks? From what I can gather, it takes the U.S. about two years to build an Abrams tank starting from an existing hull (they have plenty of old hulls that they just re-kit to modern equipment), and a capacity of about 300 per year. So if the U.S. placed an order for 300 new tanks with a hull starting from scratch, they probably wouldn't all be ready for deployment until 2029. Time frame for the newest model of tank, from initial order to first (not 300) unit being deployed, is currently projected 65 months. Actual time will likely be longer. So it would take us even longer than Germany to put 300 of those on the line.

In wartime, when you dismantle the civilian economy and turn every auto plant and bus manufacturer into an armored vehicle maker, you can vastly increase the speed and output. But in peacetime? Are you sure that your description of Germany's timeframe isn't actually a pretty good outcome?

It shows that even the face of imminent national need...they can't act decisively.

It's not imminent national need. The situation with Russia isn't on their border, and actually hasn't gone up to even a NATO border. As long as the U.S. is a member of NATO, there is no imminent direct threat to Germany's territorial integrity. If Russia had crossed into a NATO country, you would see a different threat profile - and a different reaction from Germany. As it is, it is still peacetime in the interior of the NATO area, and so all parties involved have been appropriately pursuing their defense strategy on that basis.

They're not at war. They're not on a war-time footing, and don't need to be at this stage. I'm not sure why your expectations are so far out of line with what the situation actually calls for, but this isn't an emergency for Germany. They have to do things, yes - and they have vulnerabilities and weaknesses due to their economic reliance on Russian energy, just as we have with our reliance on foreign chips and rare earths and the like. But they're not facing "imminent national need," and they're acting pretty decisively - as your observation about their huge tank order and their volte face on clean energy (telling the Greens to shove it) demonstrates.

I went to law school so I wouldn't have to do math, but that certainly seems to me like a lot less than 100 years. That's a lot of tanks - their entire inventory right now is only about 300 tanks. And building tanks is probably a bit more complicated than artillery or ordinance. So it seems to me that if Germany can increase their entire tank inventory by a third in about five years, they should be able to manage increasing their artillery supply in less than a century, if pressed.


The point is that even in the face of the very thing they claim is their number 1 existential threat...they're not in a hurry.
They just aren't, I'm sorry.

It's not imminent national need.

Getting more energy online IS an imminent need of theirs thanks to decades of Green policy.

I'm not sure why your expectations are so far out of line with what the situation actually calls for, but this isn't an emergency for Germany.

My expectations? I'm not even sure what you're arguing any more, to be honest.

The current world situation dictates that the US pivot towards the Pacific as the region of interest. That means asking the Europeans to shoulder more of their defense budgets. It means no blank checks from us.

The Europeans, in the face of that, are not going to suddenly be at each others' throats.

We're too greedy to do certain things.

EU keeps theatening taxes and all sots of other shit on Big Tech (Liberal corporations, hardly my darlings but nevertheless they are impressive, and tech owns the world and humanity)

Just once, i'd love to see said corporations just pull out. End all service to the EU. No more i phone, no more i tune, no google, no nothing.

See how that works out for them,

You’re touching on some great things.

No one on this board wants to even acknowledge that Trump might have a point - foreign markets are often closed to American goods. Other governments steal IP and tax the crap out of US firms.

All the while we give them open access to the US. In exchange we get the “privilege” of paying for Europe’s defense. What a deal!

The WSj is the first media outfit to figure that, hey, you *can* couple multiple issues together when negotiating. You don’t HAVE TO only discuss one thing.

unclear who the debating blocked idiot is here, but europe finished 6 massive LNG facilities in 2023 to insure against russian supply. that is ~40billion m^3 funded and built in ~1.5yrs, near 'china-speed'.

but, yeah, munitions will be a big mystery for the continent with the most industrial experience in chemicals that was at the center of 2 world wars.

I'm not sure why your expectations are so far out of line with what the situation actually calls for...

Give him the benefit of the doubt, and just say "bad news sources".

You are correct (again) about Germany, and NATO. They aren't at war. But they are supplying Ukraine. Plus, several other European nations (and some non-European ones) buy Leopards (actually, Leopard II...they upgraded). I'm sure Rheinmetall has a backlog of orders from other governments, not just Germany.

Fortunately, they are unlikely to need much hardware for themselves. Putin's war has drained their boneyards (satellite evidence shows they've been emptying equipment yards from as far back was WWII), sapped their military, and their people aren't likely to be content too much longer. War-time economies suck, and getting your sons/husbands back in body bags also sucks. Putin would be making the same mistake Hitler did (Barbarossa) if he opened another conflict so soon after Ukraine.

The point is that even in the face of the very thing they claim is their number 1 existential threat...they're not in a hurry.
They just aren't, I'm sorry.

They are. 300 tanks in five years starting from scratch (not refurbishing hulls) is actually pretty fast. The U.S. has an existing tank manufacturing infrastructure, and we're looking at a longer time frame to bring our new tanks to deployment. And even the refurb/update of existing Abrams hulls takes us more than three years to move 300 tanks to deployment. So they're moving pretty quickly for peacetime arms development.

Same goes for energy deployment - they've pivoted hard and fast to replace their now-jeopardized Russia sources of fossil fuels, basically jettisoning the green agenda you so often lambaste, and moving to exploit domestic and "friendly" sources of fossil fuels. As noted above, they're moving at near-China speed on that.

I think you're just coming from an incorrect factual basis. They are moving very fast, but you think they're not in a hurry.

* * *

As for the threat of Europe....I certainly don't disagree that China presents a major strategic threat to the United States, and we probably need more resources there. But I think you're ignoring history by dismissing the need to maintain a strong presence in Europe also. Remember, China doesn't really pose much of a direct threat to the territory of the United States as it does a threat to our allies and trading partners in the region. We need to boost our presence there to thwart that threat, not to rebuff a possible invasion of the U.S. West Coast. But that's the exact same threat profile that we face in Europe today - and it's actually Russia, not China, that's been directly nibbling off little pieces of their surrounding neighbors by direct military action over the last decade or so.

And again, historically, the U.S.' biggest military conflicts have been when we've had to ride off to Europe and get involved in a World War. It's very easy to dismiss that possibility, because we've had 80 years of Pax Americana - but if you're deciding to eliminate the Pax Americana and get all those European countries to re-arm themselves again, you dramatically raise the risk profile over there. Because once one of your neighbors starts increasing their armed forces to the point where they do pose a military threat to you, you have to address that possible threat through either militarization of your own country or through alliances (or both). Which puts dry tinder on the base of Europe.

It's very unlikely that a European war would start with the same countries as last time, of course - we're not likely to see Germany invading France. If you had to play out a possible scenario, it's most likely that you'd see the spark lit between Greece and Turkey, which are both heavily militarized relative to their size in response to their several conflicts with each other.

As much as we might want to not have to be ready to fight a large-scale war in Europe in addition to anywhere else, the truth is we always have to be able to do so. Because a large-scale war in Europe remains a possibility, and the chances of it happening go up considerably if we end the Pax Americana there.

They are. 300 tanks in five years starting from scratch (not refurbishing hulls) is actually pretty fast.

Where do you get 300 from? The Leopard number is 105 and it's going to take them 5 or more years. For the record the US tank production rate is currently 12 per month.

Same goes for energy deployment - they've pivoted hard and fast to replace their now-jeopardized Russia sources of fossil fuels, basically jettisoning the green agenda you so often lambaste, and moving to exploit domestic and "friendly" sources of fossil fuels. As noted above, they're moving at near-China speed on that.

Actually, as noted upthread they're moving in fits and starts.

I think you're just coming from an incorrect factual basis. They are moving very fast, but you think they're not in a hurry.

They're moving as fast as their political system will allow> them to move. Which...isn't as fast as they need.

And that's another point. You keep mentioning that without the US in charge of their security, Europe is going to devolve into a series of warrior states constantly conquering one another. But as has been illustrated here, even in the face of an imminent threat it's taking them a long time to get their acts together. In other words, their political structure isn't built to go out and lay waste to continents.

It's very easy to dismiss that possibility, because we've had 80 years of Pax Americana - but if you're deciding to eliminate the Pax Americana and get all those European countries to re-arm themselves again, you dramatically raise the risk profile over there.

No one is saying 'pull out of Europe completely'. However, there's no need to station many tens of thousands of US troops there nor is there a need for clouds of aircraft. There will soon be a need to have those in the Pacific theater along with a Navy capable of confronting the PLAN at sea (and not for nothing, a logistical fleet able to move supplies around the globe).

The logistics elements are actually where the real US emergency is today.

One more point.
Why is asking the Europeans merely to return to their early 2000's levels of armaments 'abandoning Pax America'? It isn't, not in any way, shape or form.

Where do you get 300 from? The Leopard number is 105 and it's going to take them 5 or more years. For the record the US tank production rate is currently 12 per month.

Sorry - that was a typo that I kept repeating.

As for the U.S. production rate, that's different from the amount of time it takes to build a tank. If it takes me two years to build a tank (from refurb), and I commence twelve tank starts a month, in two years I'll be producing 12 per month - but it still takes me two years from when I start refurbishing the tank until it's ready. For refurbishing existing Abrams hulls, the U.S. takes about two years to go from starting the process to the tank being ready for deployment. The process for the new tanks that the Army is going to order, which don't use existing hulls, is projected to take about 65 months from order placement to delivery.

They're moving as fast as their political system will allow> them to move. Which...isn't as fast as they need.

Yes, it is, and it's really fast. Again, Russia isn't an imminent threat, and they're still under the NATO umbrella. That means they don't need to upend their economy to convert to a wartime footing.

No one is saying 'pull out of Europe completely'. However, there's no need to station many tens of thousands of US troops there nor is there a need for clouds of aircraft. There will soon be a need to have those in the Pacific theater along with a Navy capable of confronting the PLAN at sea (and not for nothing, a logistical fleet able to move supplies around the globe).

Yes, there is a need. Because having 80K troops and clouds of aircraft means that the nations of Europe don't need to be independently ready to take on an invasion (should one happen) on their own. And because they don't have to do that, it dramatically lowers the temperature and risk of intra-European war.

Now - whether that need is greater than other needs around the globe? A more complicated question. But there are negative consequences to the U.S. dialing down its military footprint in Europe and getting all those individual countries to dial up their own. And given European history before we decided to become the overwhelming military force on the Continent, the risks posed by doing this should be treated as considerable.

Why is asking the Europeans merely to return to their early 2000's levels of armaments 'abandoning Pax America'? It isn't, not in any way, shape or form.

Spending 5% of GDP on defense isn't merely a return to the Pax America status quo ante. It's a significant remilitarization of Europe beyond those early 2000's level. About 2.5x spending. To put that in context, the delta from today's 2.1% of GDP being spend on defense would result in an additional $6 trillion being newly spent annually on European military - which is like adding six entire U.S. militaries on top of what's being spent now. A massive rearmament of Europe. Even making them increase defense spending by a single percentage point of GDP is $2 trillion in new spending, which would (again) be like adding two U.S. militaries on top of all their armed forces.

And as you have alluded to on this thread, pressing them to do that is a precursor to significantly reallocating U.S. military forces out of the Continent and into Asian theaters. That would certainly improve our security posture vis-à-vis China....but at the cost of reducing our security posture vis-a-vis either an invasion of Europe or an intra-European war.

Both those things combined would result in the end of the Pax Americana in Europe, where the U.S. had an overwhelming footprint and the countries would have to rely on a collective military response via NATO (including the U.S.) to achieve any military goal. That level of spending would render U.S. forces a more minor player and give many of the countries there a newfound ability to pursue military objectives that are currently beyond their grasp. That has positive aspects (now they can defend themselves without NATO!), and negative aspects (now military adventurism becomes possible!).

Yes, there is a need. Because having 80K troops and clouds of aircraft means that the nations of Europe don't need to be independently ready to take on an invasion (should one happen) on their own. And because they don't have to do that, it dramatically lowers the temperature and risk of intra-European war.

How does this square with
Again, Russia isn't an imminent threat, and they're still under the NATO umbrella. That means they don't need to upend their economy to convert to a wartime footing.

Going back to 2004 levels or armament...isn't enough to ratchet up anything on the continent. Even at 1990 levels it's not enough for a France or a Germany to do anything.

We're going to have to agree to disagree here. There's nothing unreasonable about asking the Europeans to commit to their own defenses, to stop buying energy from Russia, and in allowing US goods to enter their market. For such staunch "allies" they've committed very little to their own defenses, have helped bankroll the Russia economy and until Trump showed up had 4x the tariffs plus who knows what else on US autos and other products.

There is no "level playing field". The "level playing field" has for the past several years tilted away from the US.

That's great for them to say, but it's going to take the Germans 100 years to build something as simple as artillery pieces.

If you ignore all of the advances we've made since WW2, this still isn't true. I take it you think German engineering is terrible? That the intricacies of producing an artillery shell or an artillery piece are so advanced it would take them 100 years to catch up? You think they'd be terrible at the drone warfare we're currently experiencing? Please explain how you determined this 100 year figure. Enquiring minds want to know. :)

Please explain how you determined this 100 year figure. Enquiring minds want to know. :)

Read the thread. You'll see the quote from the study.

Yes, there is a need. Because having 80K troops and clouds of aircraft means that the nations of Europe don't need to be independently ready to take on an invasion (should one happen) on their own. And because they don't have to do that, it dramatically lowers the temperature and risk of intra-European war.

How does this square with

Again, Russia isn't an imminent threat, and they're still under the NATO umbrella. That means they don't need to upend their economy to convert to a wartime footing.

Pretty easily. Russia is a threat to the EU and NATO. It is not an imminent threat, in the sense that Russia is not presently attacking the EU or NATO. And it is a threat that is more or less countered by the massive combined military forces defending, of which a large portion consist of American air and naval forces.

So there's no need for Germany to, say, seize control of VW's factories under wartime authority and convert them from making Golfs to making armored vehicles. Russia's not attacking yet, nor is America leaving. So moving with all deliberate speed consistent with a peacetime industrial economy is just fine. And that's what they're doing.

Going back to 2004 levels or armament...isn't enough to ratchet up anything on the continent.

Nor is it enough to allow the U.S. to materially redeploy resources away from the continent. Which is why that's not what's on the table. In 2004, European military expenditures were about 1.6% of GDP. Lower than what it is today.

We're not asking the Europeans to go back to 2004 - we're asking them to go to 5% of GDP, which is vastly higher than 2004. It hasn't been that high for more than five decades - the height of the Cold War in the 1960's.

There's nothing unreasonable about asking the Europeans to commit to their own defenses, to stop buying energy from Russia, and in allowing US goods to enter their market.

No one's saying it's "unreasonable." It just might not be a smart policy. It certainly isn't without downsides, in addition to upsides. Having the Europeans "commit to their own defense" will certainly free up resources for the U.S....but it will also make Europe less stable and increase the risk of intra-European conflicts, and reduce our ability to project power in not only Europe but in the Middle East as well. Is that a good trade-off? It may or may not be - but it is a trade-off, not an unalloyed win.

So too with our trade war. You noted that the U.S. GDP has grown much faster than that of Europe, which allows us to be stronger and have more a military presence than they probably can afford. But note that during that time, the U.S. was the one running a trade deficit, and the EU running a trade surplus. Yet our economy has grown vastly faster than theirs. In part, because we learned the lesson that the old Mercantilists never understood - to grow your economy, it's better to have stuff than it is to have bullion. You can make things with copper and steel and auto parts and computer equipment, but you can't make things (or not many things) with gold ingots or silver bars or T-bills and promissory notes. Trade with the EU consists of them giving us tons of actual useful physical things, and we give them financial products that increase in value much more slowly than our economy. It's not "unreasonable" for us to ask that to stop - but it probably isn't very smart to do so.

Having troops in Europe is for the same reason we have troops in Korea. Any attack will almost certainly cause US casualties, and we will respond. Any potential attacker knows that is a big risk, and -so far- have demurred.

You don't throw a water balloon at the skinny kid when he's standing next to the defensive lineman on the school team.

And given European history before we decided to become the overwhelming military force on the Continent, the risks posed by doing this should be treated as considerable.


Let me play devil's advocate for a moment.

WWII ended 80 years ago. There has been an entire generation of people born (and mostly died) since that war ended. Those who were actually old enough to remember the war are in their 90s. Those old enough to have served are approaching or over 100 years old.

Almost the entire population of the planet has spent their lifetimes with a peaceful Europe.

Much of Europe is now in a political and economic union. They largely share a common currency. They travel freely between the countries of the EU. The EU government serves as a way to negotiate and resolve disputes between the EU states without resorting to war. Through NATO, they share a common defense.

So is the threat of war between individual European states as much of a risk as it was 80+ years ago? I suspect it is not. There are more ties keeping the nations of Europe together - political, economic, and social - than there have ever been in history.

I don't disagree that the benefits of a peaceful Europe have been good for America. But the cost of those benefits is not insignificant. At some point, we have to ask if it is time to let Europe take more responsibility for their own security. This is not a bad time to begin that process. Russia is not the same threat today that the USSR posed 40 years ago. They are struggling in Ukraine and have been weakened by that ill-advised fight. They represent a smaller threat to Europe than they have at any time since the establishment of the Soviet Union.

This could be a good time to reduce (not eliminate, but reduce) our presence in Europe while assisting the European countries to build up their own military in a coordinated and mutually beneficial way.

--Peter

Pretty easily. Russia is a threat to the EU and NATO. It is not an imminent threat, in the sense that Russia is not presently attacking the EU or NATO. And it is a threat that is more or less countered by the massive combined military forces defending, of which a large portion consist of American air and naval forces.

Not an imminent threat? Then what's the concern with the Ukraine, then?
And wouldn't it seem prudent to ramp up armament production when you know what the consumption rate of tanks, guns, bullets and shells is over there?

So there's no need for Germany to, say, seize control of VW's factories under wartime authority and convert them from making Golfs to making armored vehicles. Russia's not attacking yet, nor is America leaving. So moving with all deliberate speed consistent with a peacetime industrial economy is just fine. And that's what they're doing.

Good thing no one has suggested the Germans nationalize VW or Audi. All that's being suggested is that they recover some of the production capacity they seem to have let fall by the wayside in the last 20 years.

We're not asking the Europeans to go back to 2004 - we're asking them to go to 5% of GDP, which is vastly higher than 2004. It hasn't been that high for more than five decades - the height of the Cold War in the 1960's.

And they've...agreed. Everyone but Spain, that is.

No one's saying it's "unreasonable." It just might not be a smart policy.

Hold up. So continuing to fund the guy that's blowing up stuff is smart policy? Don't they want the war to end?

Having the Europeans "commit to their own defense" will certainly free up resources for the U.S....but it will also make Europe less stable and increase the risk of intra-European conflicts, and reduce our ability to project power in not only Europe but in the Middle East as well. Is that a good trade-off? It may or may not be - but it is a trade-off, not an unalloyed win.

This is a devil-in-the-details comment obviously depending on the *degree* of how much Europe arms itself. Again, it's not unreasonable to ask them to have some level of deployable forces such that it doesn't take 5 years to stick a brigade in another NATO country (which is where they find themselves today).

You noted that the U.S. GDP has grown much faster than that of Europe, which allows us to be stronger and have more a military presence than they probably can afford. But note that during that time, the U.S. was the one running a trade deficit, and the EU running a trade surplus. Yet our economy has grown vastly faster than theirs.

Ooooo. You're conflating a bunch of things.
Us not being able to export goods to them (like cars) is a speed brake on US economic growth. Their regulatory structure is a speed brake on theirs. There's a reason why this list:

https://www.forbes.com/lists/global2000/

...doesn't feature a European country until you hit #15. Europe only sports...1...company in the top 20. (The US has 12)

And only 10 of the top 50.

Trade with the EU consists of them giving us tons of actual useful physical things, and we give them financial products that increase in value much more slowly than our economy. It's not "unreasonable" for us to ask that to stop - but it probably isn't very smart to do so.

Except that...we can do both.

So is the threat of war between individual European states as much of a risk as it was 80+ years ago? I suspect it is not.

Maybe?

Right-wing nationalism has been on the rise over there. Few people directly remember the war now. But it was a rise of right-wing nationalism that led to WWII. With US dominance in the military sphere, none had enough of a military to engage in much aggression. Though, I remember about 30 years ago when the Balkans exploded...genocide...all that fun stuff. It didn't end until the US (mostly) ended it pretty decisively. If European nations arm-up enough, they would be more likely to act on old grudges...sometimes really old grudges...as in, older than the USofA. I don't really understand it, but I know it's there.

So is the threat of war between individual European states as much of a risk as it was 80+ years ago? I suspect it is not. There are more ties keeping the nations of Europe together - political, economic, and social - than there have ever been in history.

As much? No, not in the very short run.

But it's still a pretty considerable risk. There are lots of ties among the nations of Europe, it's true. But the risk isn't an "all against all" kind of conflict. Rather, it's that the Continent ends up doing what it used to do - seeing different countries ally with other countries in blocs and groups in an effort to seek power, and to balance power against potential military risks.

So if you asked me what one scenario might look like in a short time frame, here's a plausible one:

1) Over the next several years, various different countries in Europe follow Hungary and Poland's lead in electing right-wing nationalist leaders. Those countries (along with like Belgium, Croatia, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden) end up being joined by at least one right-wing nationalist government among the major powers: say, an unexpected success in France or Germany.

2) The division of countries into a growing right-wing faction and waning center-left faction in European governmental institutions causes both tensions within those organizations as the two groups jockey for power on issues where they differ (immigration, responses to right-wing governments abroad, economic policy). Those tensions also lead those nations to form bonds outside the formal European system. You re-create the structure of two or more "camps" within Europe that are allied within the groups, and hostile to the other group(s).

3) Some error, mistake, or minor conflict ends up escalating into an actual military clash between NATO members. Say, between Turkey and Greece (who both maintain big armed forces because of mistrust of each other). Or the Balkans - it's always the Balkans. Both countries claim they were attacked by the other, both invoke NATO's obligation for others to defend against the attacking country, and the two camps start sending troops to the clashing countries, and you end up with some event getting way out of hand.

Of course, there's the longer term risk as well - that the increased militarization of Europe starts to erode all those ties you mention. Their geopolitical risk has contributed in no small part to the "hang together or we'll hang separately" attitude towards military matters - they need NATO because that's the vehicle that brings in US military power. If the US is no longer a major presence in Europe's defense planning, then that unity becomes less important for national security. Who knows what happens if that timber is removed from the support? It doesn't take too many Brexits driven by domestic politics to undermine the European project, and there's more than a few anti-immigration nationalist groups that would love to light a match under the EU....

Not an imminent threat? Then what's the concern with the Ukraine, then?
And wouldn't it seem prudent to ramp up armament production when you know what the consumption rate of tanks, guns, bullets and shells is over there?

The concern is that it's a violation of international law and the entire Westphalian order for a country like Russia to just invade another country. It's not an imminent threat, because Russia didn't invade NATO itself (much less Germany) - but it's very important that the use of war to seize the territory of another sovereign state be fully punished and (hopefully) reversed.

Of course it's prudent to ramp up armament production, which is why Germany is ramping up armament production. German arms and munitions business is booming (no pun intended) - it's growing like gangbusters these days:

https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/business/germa...

...which, again, is why the EU Commission's hint that they'll be buying tons of weapons from the US is so laughable. It's a growth industry and a reliable source of export revenues for Germany - the government's 100% on board with having that extra military expenditure be made domestically.

Again, it's not unreasonable to ask them to have some level of deployable forces such that it doesn't take 5 years to stick a brigade in another NATO country (which is where they find themselves today).

Why is that not unreasonable? It would take us at least three years to stick an extra tank brigade of similar size into another NATO country. That's how long it would take us to make 100+ more Abrams tanks than are currently in process, starting from the date we placed the order. It would probably take us close to five years to put an extra tank brigade somewhere that wasn't based on existing Abrams hulls that are being repurposed. Germany's got about 200K members serving in their armed forces - they could relocate an existing brigade to another NATO country within a few days. They just can't generate produce an extra 100 tanks in the space of a moment any more than we can.

Except that...we can do both.

We do both. Now. But we do more of sending them financial products in exchange for useful physical things than the reverse. There's benefits to that. Having ready access to lots of physical things that can be used for a wide variety of economically viable activities is a benefit, and those things are often much more useful than the financial products we send them in return (like the bullion of old). Trump's policy is to try to change that balance, and to start getting fewer useful physical things from Europe.

The concern is that it's a violation of international law and the entire Westphalian order for a country like Russia to just invade another country.

That's not the concern. What you're describing above is the Diplomats Getting The Vapors stage of things. That should have happened when Putin seized the Crimea or his invasion of Georgia. The full scale invasion of the Ukraine is a whole other kettle of fish; no diplomat at Whitehall or Brussels is under the illusion that some tea and crumpets are going to be the answer.

...which, again, is why the EU Commission's hint that they'll be buying tons of weapons from the US is so laughable. It's a growth industry and a reliable source of export revenues for Germany - the government's 100% on board with having that extra military expenditure be made domestically.

Laughable, eh. How many 5th generation+ aircraft does the European Union build? The answer is - zero. Their NGF airframe won't enter service until the 2030s.

Germany's got about 200K members serving in their armed forces - they could relocate an existing brigade to another NATO country within a few days. They just can't generate produce an extra 100 tanks in the space of a moment any more than we can.

You're missing the point. The reason why it's going to take Germany 3 years to deploy anyone is because they haven't got anyone to deploy.

But we do more of sending them financial products in exchange for useful physical things than the reverse. There's benefits to that. Having ready access to lots of physical things that can be used for a wide variety of economically viable activities is a benefit, and those things are often much more useful than the financial products we send them in return (like the bullion of old). Trump's policy is to try to change that balance, and to start getting fewer useful physical things from Europe.

Sigh. I've also been reading your analysis of tariffs in the other thread and you're really missing the bigger picture in some ways.
There are more than a few in the government that think 2027+ is when things get spicy with China. That means the US needs to be getting ready -now- to have certain things good to go and lined up.

Trump is doing 2 things right now. He's attempting a forced reset of the US economy by applying tariffs and setting incentives for firms to onshore production of certain things here in the US. He's also tying the rapid expansion of local sourcing of critical materials, components and production of entire systems to US national security to degrees that haven't been done before. I'd encourage you to read up on what Anduril Industries is up to along with Palantir and a few others.

Allowing the status quo to continue wasn't going to work in the long term. We can't keep growing our economy at these kinds of rates and racking up this kind of debt forever. Something needed to be done.

We can't keep growing our economy at these kinds of rates and racking up this kind of debt forever.

Why not? Remember Ronnie Raygun? Spankee is far more stupid, with even more ridiculous claims. Remember what happened in Kansas when they followed what Spankee claimed? They went BUST. People leaving at record rates--jobs offered, but nobody would work for them. Sound familiar? Yeah, it is the "American field worker"--which is essentially non-existent.

When Spankee is gone, so is the value of EVERYTHING he grifted to his followers. Less value than crappy Elvis coins/plates/whatever from the Franklin Mint and every other business trying to make a quick killing in the direct-sale market.

Us not being able to export goods to them (like cars) is a speed brake on US economic growth. Their regulatory structure is a speed brake on theirs.

You mean the US ban on Chinese EVs is a speed brake on their economy? So why ban them? So, you must disapprove of Spankee's tariffs.

Also, based on your claim(s), any ban on anything is a brake on somebody's economy. Tariffs are a form of ban, so no bans allowed (per you).

What next?

Dope1: We can't keep growing our economy at these kinds of rates and racking up this kind of debt forever.

C'mon, ya' can't be serious.

Economists project that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act will add $3.4 trillion to the federal deficit.

Stop with the Mad King Donald math, will ya'.

"And again, historically, the U.S.' biggest military conflicts have been when we've had to ride off to Europe and get involved in a World War. It's very easy to dismiss that possibility, because we've had 80 years of Pax Americana - but if you're deciding to eliminate the Pax Americana and get all those European countries to re-arm themselves again, you dramatically raise the risk profile over there. Because once one of your neighbors starts increasing their armed forces to the point where they do pose a military threat to you, you have to address that possible threat through either militarization of your own country or through alliances (or both). Which puts dry tinder on the base of Europe.

It's very unlikely that a European war would start with the same countries as last time, of course - we're not likely to see Germany invading France. If you had to play out a possible scenario, it's most likely that you'd see the spark lit between Greece and Turkey, which are both heavily militarized relative to their size in response to their several conflicts with each other." - Albaby1

Also, Russia will be much more active in helping start any war in Europe even if they are not direct participants initially. Through sabotage, propaganda, etc. they will fan the flames of conflict between any two European countries that are having a dispute. Especially if it involves one of their European neighbors that used to be under Soviet influence.

You're missing the point. The reason why it's going to take Germany 3 years to deploy anyone is because they haven't got anyone to deploy.

Their military has ~200,000 active duty members. The reason it's going to take them that long to send those tanks is because it takes that long to build 100+ new tanks from scratch.

Sigh. I've also been reading your analysis of tariffs in the other thread and you're really missing the bigger picture in some ways.
There are more than a few in the government that think 2027+ is when things get spicy with China. That means the US needs to be getting ready -now- to have certain things good to go and lined up.

I think you're missing the bigger picture in some ways, too. The fact that China has become a very large national security risk does not mean that Europe becomes any less of a national security risk. A new large threat in Asia might affect the relative military needs of the two theaters, but it doesn't reduce or diminish the specific threats posed in the European theater.

So if the response to rising Chinese power is to transfer resources from one theater to the other, there are downsides to that. It increases our exposure to the risk of negative consequences in Europe, if we're not maintaining as heavy a footprint there to put a lid on things.

I don't disagree that China is a very serious threat, or even that countering it is be more important than countering intra-European conflicts (Russia is another matter). But that doesn't make any other threats in the world any less serious, except on a relative level.

Allowing the status quo to continue wasn't going to work in the long term. We can't keep growing our economy at these kinds of rates and racking up this kind of debt forever.

Would have thought that would argue against continuing our present taxing and spending levels over the next decade, as the OBBB does. If the argument is that we can't rack up debt, that's a taxation and spending argument, not a tariffs and trade argument. Foreign investors don't hold an especially large percentage of our federal debt these days, and it's been declining for the last twenty years or so:

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/foreign-investor...

...so the weapon to attack debt is fiscal policy, not trade policy.

Their military has ~200,000 active duty members. The reason it's going to take them that long to send those tanks is because it takes that long to build 100+ new tanks from scratch.

And train the crews
And train the mechanics
And set up a logistical train
And
And
And

...all of which is a mere restatement of my point. They haven't got anyone to send.

The fact that China has become a very large national security risk does not mean that Europe becomes any less of a national security risk. A new large threat in Asia might affect the relative military needs of the two theaters, but it doesn't reduce or diminish the specific threats posed in the European theater.

So if the response to rising Chinese power is to transfer resources from one theater to the other, there are downsides to that. It increases our exposure to the risk of negative consequences in Europe, if we're not maintaining as heavy a footprint there to put a lid on things.

Okay. So you think that Macron or Starmer or Kolz is really Napoleon Bonaparte IV (the 3rd was actually Emperor of France) ready to march to Moscow like his great-great-great-great-great grandad?

If the argument is that we can't rack up debt, that's a taxation and spending argument, not a tariffs and trade argument. Foreign investors don't hold an especially large percentage of our federal debt these days, and it's been declining for the last twenty years or so:

I covered this in my other thread. The tariffs are a stealth form of taxation, a back door way to implement a consumption VAT if certain industries don't onshore back to the United States.

..all of which is a mere restatement of my point. They haven't got anyone to send.

Which is exactly the same situation we're in. Our mechanics and logistical train and crews are generally right-sized to our existing tank fleet. So if we wanted to add 100 new tanks from scratch - as Germany is doing - we also wouldn't have anyone to send today. Because we don't have entire divisions of tank crews and logistical support waiting around doing nothing on the off chance that we might increase our tank levels by a division or two down the road.

I'm not sure what you're criticizing Germany for. They're taking pretty much the exact same amount of time we would take to create and man a delta of about 100 tanks.

Okay. So you think that Macron or Starmer or Kolz is really Napoleon Bonaparte IV (the 3rd was actually Emperor of France) ready to march to Moscow like his great-great-great-great-great grandad?

No - I think that Europe is still very much structurally susceptible to letting a minor conflict (say, some inciting incident in the Balkans) spread. WWI didn't happen because of some wannbe Alexander the Great seeking to bestride Europe. It happened because when you have a lot of countries with varying military strengths all jostled together, they end up forming alliances and entanglements in order to advance their security and other interests. So if two countries that are in competing camps end up getting into some scrap or minor regional conflict, it can get everyone involved.

I covered this in my other thread. The tariffs are a stealth form of taxation, a back door way to implement a consumption VAT if certain industries don't onshore back to the United States.

But as we've talked about, they don't really do that much on either front. The level of taxation isn't high enough to dent the deficit, much less the debt, even if there's no on-shoring, because only about 10% of U.S. goods consumption is imported. So the delta in taxation is a few hundred billion dollars per year (again, before consumer shifts). Even less when consumption shifts - an estimated $200 billion per year. But all of that (and more) was "given back" by just three new provisions of the OBBBA (not just the tax cut extenders). The expanded Social Security tax exemption, new auto loan interest deduction and "no tax on tips" will reduce government revenues by more than the tariffs raise them.

And because the tariffs apply to all consumer goods, very little of their impact is directed to "certain industries." The tariffs have to be far too low to materially induce those "certain industries" to relocate to the U.S., because otherwise consumers would revolt because they apply to everything - so instead of having, say, high punitive tariffs on the importation of strategically important resources to serve a national security interest, we have a more general tariff on everything.

Which is exactly the same situation we're in. Our mechanics and logistical train and crews are generally right-sized to our existing tank fleet. So if we wanted to add 100 new tanks from scratch - as Germany is doing - we also wouldn't have anyone to send today. Because we don't have entire divisions of tank crews and logistical support waiting around doing nothing on the off chance that we might increase our tank levels by a division or two down the road.

We have deployable forces such that we don't need to call up the tank factory and submit a PO for more tracks. Did you think that the entire Army is forward deployed already?

No - I think that Europe is still very much structurally susceptible to letting a minor conflict (say, some inciting incident in the Balkans) spread. WWI didn't happen because of some wannbe Alexander the Great seeking to bestride Europe. It happened because when you have a lot of countries with varying military strengths all jostled together, they end up forming alliances and entanglements in order to advance their security and other interests. So if two countries that are in competing camps end up getting into some scrap or minor regional conflict, it can get everyone involved.

I suggest you read Winston Churchill's The World Crisis, Volume I: 1911-1914. In it you'll get a feel for just how belligerent the continental powers towards one another. Incidentally in WC's view World War 1 started with the Agadir Crisis in 1911. Today's Europe doesn't look anything like the Europe of a century ago.

So the delta in taxation is a few hundred billion dollars per year (again, before consumer shifts).

The federal deficit is $1.8T a year. Even a few hundred billion will help.

We have deployable forces such that we don't need to call up the tank factory and submit a PO for more tracks. Did you think that the entire Army is forward deployed already?

No, but that's a different question. You're upset that Germany isn't moving with enough deliberate speed to increase their capabilities. But they're moving as fast as we would if we were trying to increase our capabilities. We couldn't bring a new tank division from order to deployment in less than five years, either. That's how long it takes to build 100 new tanks from scratch, and you can train the crew during that time.

They're moving fast.

I suggest you read Winston Churchill's The World Crisis, Volume I: 1911-1914. In it you'll get a feel for just how belligerent the continental powers towards one another. Incidentally in WC's view World War 1 started with the Agadir Crisis in 1911. Today's Europe doesn't look anything like the Europe of a century ago.

Right - because it's under the Pax Americana. The entire national security profile of Europe is subordinate to the Big Boss (the U.S.) in terms of military capabilities, with all of the national militaries locked into a supporting role in NATO and having to adjust their international relations accordingly. You're talking about changing that. Reducing the American footprint, beefing up every individual national army, and getting them all to the point where they all have duplicative but fully independent military capacity. Inviting the Continent back into a situation where individual nations' national security isn't assured through collective security, but individual security.

You think that the Europe of a decade or two after you implement that will look like the Europe of today?

The federal deficit is $1.8T a year. Even a few hundred billion will help.

Except the OBBB already gave back that few hundred billion in just a few of the new tax cuts - leave aside the tax extensions and expansions. There's no support for the claim that this a component of some larger effort to restore fiscal stability to the U.S., rather than Trump's idee fixe that trade deficits mean other countries are ripping us off.

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