It is IMPOSSIBLE to funnel EVERY rule-making decision related to a larger direction set forth in a law back through a legistlative process. Claiming that concepts of administrative law and rule-making are violations of the people's sovereignty and amount to an unconstititutional vesting of power in unelected officials is Federalist Society hyperbole providing cover for the goal of elimiminating all meaningful protections of worker safety, environmental protection, financial protection and basic civil rights provided by a government managing the affairs of hundreds of millions of citizens.

To clarify, Chevron (and thus the case that might lead to it being limited or overruled) deals with a different issue than the one described above.

There are two separate (though related) issues SCOTUS has been dealing with in their recent jurisprudence. The first deals with the permissibility and scope of Congressional delegation to agencies - how much power has been delegated to agencies by Congress (the major questions doctrine) and the extent to which Congress may delegate power to agencies (the unconstitutional delegation doctrine). The second is the Chevron issue - whether the agencies are presumed to be correct when they make interpretations on various issues, or whether the courts approach it the way they would any other dispute between parties over the meaning of a statute.

Overturning Chevron will not directly affect the former issue. It will not hold that administrative law and rule-making are unconstitutional. It would, however, make it so that in litigation over disputed provisions of federal statutes, the agency's interpretation doesn't have any presumption of correctness. So agencies will still be able to issue rules and form administrative law - but the courts won't give them any deference in how they interpret the statutes that form the basis of those rules and administrative law.

Now, this likely will have an effect on the scope of administrative law anyway - which is one way the issues are related. Most directly, one of the areas that is frequently a subject of dispute between agencies and private parties is just how much power Congress has delegated. Presumably, agencies are more likely to lean towards thinking the statutes give them broader powers - so freeing courts to disagree with their read of the statute will likely narrow their power. And of course, if it's harder for agencies to win in court on the substance of their rules, not only will more rules get overturned, but the agencies may be more circumspect in issuing them in the first place.

But this is not a case where the legitimacy of delegation or administrative law generally is at issue.