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The best ATC following channel in YouTube is VAS Aviation. You can hear the entire exchange between the CRJ, the Blackhawk and the Reagan tower:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CiOybe-NJHk&ab_cha...

The callsign for the American Airlines flight was Bluestreak 5342 and the Blackhawk's PAT25. DCA Tower asks the AA flight to change to runway 33 as they fly over the bridge and 5342 acks the instruction. The American flight was following normal protocol for an approach in to Reagan.

Also in the area was the Blackhawk, flying up the river. At the 1:33 mark the tower tells the Blackhawk to look for the CRJ (Which is approaching runway 33) and notes its altitude. The tower approves "visual separation", which is an instruction for the Blackhawk to visually look for the CRJ and maintain safe distance.

At 2:17 the tower asks PAT25 if he's got the CRJ (Bluestreak 5342) in sight, then gives instructions for PAT25 to pass behind it. There's an inaudible portion, then the tower says "Vis sep approved". I don't know if PAT25 told the tower they had the CRJ in sight or not.

After that you can hear gasps in the tower and another flight (AA3130) asks the tower if they just saw what happened. The tower controllers then move to divert all other incoming traffic and close Reagan down. AARF (fire and rescue) requests access for all taxi and runways so they can roll trucks to the scene.

That's some of the most congested airspace in the country; I have no idea why they let helicopters fly up the Potomac straight across the glidepath of active runways. There's traffic literally turning in right there...that seems insane to me.

VAS has a second video up with more of the communication from the helicopter. There's some overlap with the previous video, mostly for context around the helo communication.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r90Xw3tQC0I

Thanks for posting this.

Oh, man. Originally the tower told PAT25 to look out for a CRJ at 1200 feet turning in for Runway 33.
PAT25 calls the tower and says he has the CRJ in sight, and requests visual separation. But I'd bet he was actually looking at American Flight 3130...which was downriver but operating at 1100 feet. The tower calls again after the TCAS warning goes off and PAT25 confirms the visual.

Bluestreak 5342 meanwhile was continuing its descent towards R33 and was at down to 400ft...PAT25 was flying at ~300ft if I read the telemetry correctly.

And a comment raises a good point:


@danacandella5416
51 minutes ago
Tower got the conflict alert when the accident involved aircraft were 1 nm apart. Why wasn't it "PAT25 turn left heading 090 immediately" not "Pass behind the CRJ"?

That's some of the most congested airspace in the country; I have no idea why they let helicopters fly up the Potomac straight across the glidepath of active runways. There's traffic literally turning in right there...that seems insane to me.

Dope, a quick question for you, since you seem far more informed about this particular topic than I am:

OPM has offered every federal employee a buy-out if they resign, effective February 8th. They expect a take rate of between 5-10%.

Could our air traffic control system function properly if 10% of air traffic controllers quit their jobs in the next week?

Could our air traffic control system function properly if 10% of air traffic controllers quit their jobs in the next week?

I'm pretty sure they weren't in the package; I'm trying to find the link on that.

At any rate, the FAA has been unable to fill its open ATC positions:


https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/14/business/faa-short-...

Despite a surge in hiring last year, air traffic control stations nationwide are still about 3,000 controllers short, according to new Federal Aviation Administration numbers.

The numbers, first reported by CNN, show the challenge of filling the gap that led to flight delays and concerns that fatigue contributed to a series of near collisions on runways last year.

Controller fatigue is a thing. VAS Aviation had an incident only a few weeks ago when a controller turned 2 jets right into each other. TCAS went off and both pilots were able to take evasive maneuvers. That could have been a major disaster. One pilot ripped the tower over the radio for that.

Tower got the conflict alert when the accident involved aircraft were 1 nm apart.

---------------

If the alert was triggered only when there remained one nanometer of separation I think the crash was inevitable at that point.

I'm pretty sure they weren't in the package; I'm trying to find the link on that.

Per the OPM website, it certainly seems like they might be:

Deferred resignation is available to all full-time federal employees except for military personnel of the armed forces, employees of the U.S. Postal Service, those in positions related to immigration enforcement and national security, and those in other positions specifically excluded by your employing agency.

https://www.opm.gov/fork/faq

On its face, it would apply. But not clear whether the FAA (the employing agency) took any action to exclude controllers from the buyout, since it had neither an Administrator (he resigned after Trump got elected) nor an acting Administrator (Trump appointed one today).

Similar confusion abounds over whether air traffic controllers are also covered by the hiring freeze.

But if 10% of the controllers did resign in response to the offer...would the system still be able to function?

Why wasn't it "PAT25 turn left heading 090 immediately" not "Pass behind the CRJ"?

There are a ton of restrictions on flight paths around DC. Its quite possible that turns would not be allowed in that particular area. Turns to the helo's right would put it over the airport. Not a good spot, with lots of potential for conflict with other planes moving around. Turns to the left take it over Joint Base Anacostia and point it toward a hill that is higher than its current altitude. Not many good choices.

From my recollection, the controller told the helo the altitude of the plane to avoid, but didn't give them a direction. I've heard controllers say to look at your 1 o'clock for the target. (Just an example, but might be close to where the helo needed to be looking.) A directional indication might have helped make sure the helo pilots were looking in the right place for the conflicting traffic. Maybe.

--Peter

But if 10% of the controllers did resign in response to the offer...would the system still be able to function?

Depends on if they're able to replace the 10%.

From my recollection, the controller told the helo the altitude of the plane to avoid, but didn't give them a direction. I've heard controllers say to look at your 1 o'clock for the target. (Just an example, but might be close to where the helo needed to be looking.) A directional indication might have helped make sure the helo pilots were looking in the right place for the conflicting traffic. Maybe.

Yeah, the controller had noted that the CRJ was at 1200 feet IIRC and over a bridge; there was no other directional indication. You're right, they usually say, "Look for traffic your X o'clock at Y altitude". The helicopter pilot might have assumed the CRJ was flying straight and level...

The helicopter pilot might have assumed the CRJ was flying straight and level...

Probably not. They know the planes they're looking out for are coming in to land at the airport off to their right. But he might have been looking at a plane approaching a different runway. The CRJ was coming in to runway 33.

It's an odd approach to that runway, and must be done visually (so only in good weather). Planes actually line up for runway 1. Then at a certain point, they leave that approach, turn slightly right and follow the Potomac until they turn slightly left for the short final approach to 33. It's possible that the helo was looking at the plane behind the CRJ still on the approach to runway 1.

Still, all just conjecture at this point. At best, its one possible scenario I suspect the investigators will consider.

--Peter

Depends on if they're able to replace the 10%.

I mean - is that really a possibility? My understanding is that you have to complete the FAA Academy training in order to be a controller, and that's not something that can be done quickly. If 10% of the controllers resigned, there's no plausible way to replace them in less than a year or so. Or even afterwards in any reasonable time frame.

You could theoretically expand the class size at the FAA Academy to push out more than the usual number of graduates - but remember that the academy teachers and staff also got the buyout offer! So even as the buyout creates a gap in the number of controllers you have, it also creates a gap in the resources to train new ones.

So I think the question should assume that you can't replace the 10%. Is there enough slack in the system that they could lose 10% of the controllers and still function with that number fewer?

So I think the question should assume that you can't replace the 10%. Is there enough slack in the system that they could lose 10% of the controllers and still function with that number fewer?

1. You're assuming the offer extends to the people you mentioned. I don't know.
2. Controllers were already understaffed, so that problem would get more acute.

There have been several lawsuits filed about the FAA's hiring practices going back for a decade with the primary complaint being that the FAA was turning away candidates in the pursuit of "diversity". I don't know if that's true or not but one of the documents unearthed asked a question, "How much of a change in job performance is acceptable to achieve what diversity goals?"...uhhh...in the Controller business the answer is zero change in job performance.

Lots of sources say "no". There is no slack, there is a shortage. One number I saw was 3000 ATCs. Here's just one of many links talking about the shortage:

https://www.globaltrademag.com/us-air-traffic-cont...

We can't lose 10% safely, we need to retain them all, and get some more.

Controllers were already understaffed, so that problem would get more acute.

Right. That's what I was trying to figure out. We know they're understaffed, but so far (present tragedy excepted) it has generally been possible to operate a functioning air traffic system even with the understaffing.

If we lost some outrageous number of controllers - say 70% - the system would break down. I assume that if we lost a less outrageous but still large number of controllers - say 40% - the system would also break under the strain.

I was just wondering if the number that the OPM expects for uptake on retirement - closer to 10% - would pose a similar systemic problem for air traffic control, or if that's still small enough that they can make it work without major consequence (again, present tragedy excepted).

Lots of sources say "no". There is no slack, there is a shortage. One number I saw was 3000 ATCs. Here's just one of many links talking about the shortage:

I mean, that's my perception as well. But Dope seemed to have some familiarity, and is probably a little more skeptical than folks in the industry who might be talking up their book (metaphorically) about where the breaking point actually is.

I'm genuinely curious, so I'm trying not to make too much of a policy point. But it does highlight to me that the folks who set this policy were probably thinking more about federal employees that sit in offices and draft regulations, rather than having in the front of their mind a federal employee like the folks who staff the FAA Academy.

We know they're understaffed, but so far (present tragedy excepted) it has generally been possible to operate a functioning air traffic system even with the understaffing.

Uhhhhh...sure. Go take a look at VAS Aviation and you'll videos of TCAS warnings and some near misses. Many folks in the aviation industry have been saying something like this is only a matter of time.

BTW, Congress voted - in a rare show of bipartisan unity - to INCREASE the amount of air traffic into Reagan last year. The vote in the Senate was 88 to 4 with the 4 "no" votes being the Senators from Virginia and Maryland.

I will say this: US Aviation is extremely safe when you look at the number of takeoffs and landings nationwide and compare it to accident rates.

My home Senator, Tim Caine, voted against the increase because Reagan airport was already severely overcrowded and overburdened. But apparently it is more convenient for the politicians themselves than having to drive to Dulles so…

I doubt Congress will take any of the blame for their actions.

So I think the question should assume that you can't replace the 10%.- albaby

----------------

It is not a given that any of them will take the offer, let alone 10%. You can "what if" yourself into paralysis if so disposed. Let us assume that all ten percent will NOT be simultaneous so the offer can be altered or rescinded after 2% have accepted. I know, the next invitation to speculate will be, Can the FAA operate with 2%".

There is no end and no acceptable answer to rhetorical questions. Playing the what if game is often fun but ultimately not productive. In my humble opinion of course.


BTW I think the FAA wss understaffed already so hope that few or none of the controllers take the offer. A significant shortage already existed across the country before Trump was even elected, and certainly that shortage made it less safe for air travel, but somehow we kept flying, and we will this time too.

Sweet, I stumbled into antlers...

It is not a given that any of them will take the offer, let alone 10%.

Of course. But that's what the folks who prepared the buyout plan expect within the range of the take rate. That's for federal employees generally, but if that's what they think the take rate might be overall, it's a plausible outcome that the take rate among air traffic controllers might hit that. It's entirely fair to talk about what the consequence would be if what they expected and intended might happen actually happens. It's not speculating into paralysis to ask about what comes next if 10% of a particular group of employees actually accepts the offer. Thinking about plausible consequences of an action is normally something one would do before taking that action, and it's worth asking whether one of the plausible outcomes of this action would be really, really bad.

Let us assume that all ten percent will NOT be simultaneous so the offer can be altered or rescinded after 2% have accepted.

Can it? I don't think that's a fair assumption, since they did an end run around the normal oversight of departments and agencies. Because of the way the federal government is structured, normally the way this type of offer would be implemented would be through the agency heads. If the President wanted all the employees to have the offer of early resignation, that would be administered with the agency heads in the loop - the offer would be implemented by the departments, and the departments would be involved with processing their responses. The department Secretaries, who have the actual knowledge of what the various agencies and employees in their departments actually do, would be included in implementing the buyout process. Normally they would be involved in planning how to handle various possible outcomes as well.

Musk (or whomever) deliberately bypassed that process. They didn't want the agency heads to be involved in the process. They set up an entire system so that they could directly reach out to all the federal employees independently. A mass email directly from OPM to the employees, and all the responses go directly from the employees to OPM, also via email. There's no role whatsoever for department or agency leadership. They might not have even known about it beforehand.

If the FAA itself was seeing the responses from their own employees, then they might realize in advance that it would be bad if too many controllers took them up on the offer. They might monitor the responses, know to look at how many of the FAA employees that took up the offer were air traffic controllers, and know to rescind the offer to air traffic controllers. It's insanely unlikely that the people who implementing this at OPM will have thought of monitoring those take rates for that specific job - if even they can in real time.

I mean, it certainly looks like no one thought to themselves what would happen if 10% of all the employees at a given VA hospital retired next week. Or if 10% of the prison guards at a given penitentiary did. Normally, if you're offering a buyout to a group of employees, you would structure it so that it was only offered to employees that you had determined you could afford to lose if they accepted it. This buyout was given to nearly all federal employees with only a few specific carveouts, and no effort to tailor it to exclude any specific jobs where it might be really problematic if there was even the expected take rate.

There's so much uncertainty (and if I may say "amateur hour") about the offer that the take rate may be much, much lower than the drafters had hoped. But there's no reason not to ask what happens if they get what they want, and there's a 10% resignation rate across all federal employees. Including among the air traffic controllers. And the people who would train any replacements.

It's starting to look like this wasn't an isolated incident:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/01/30...

Day before D.C. plane crash, another jet had to abort first landing at Reagan National
Updated
January 30, 2025 at 8:24 p.m. EST44 min ago

Just 24 hours before the collision of American Eagle Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter near Reagan National Airport on Wednesday, another jet trying to land there had to make a second approach after a helicopter appeared near its flight path, according to an audio recording from air traffic control.

That plane, Republic Airways Flight 4514, eventually landed safely, flight tracker maps show.

And here's the VAS video of the earlier incident:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huVFZ__q2rI&ab_cha...

This time the Army helo's call sign is PAT11, and he's warned by the controller that Southwest 3565 is landing on runway 19. PAT11 requests visual separation and that's granted. The tower calls SW3565 and warns them of a helicopter in their flight path.

Some things to note here- notice how the helicopter's altimeter reading keeps jumping up and down. They're supposed to stay at 200 feet but right before the TCAS alarm goes off he's at 300feet. PAT25 IIRC did the same thing.

CA is shown with Southwest 3565.

Another flight coming into land, callsign Brickyard 4514 has its TCAS go off. The pilot calls the tower and indicates they're going around. PAT11 had ascended all the way to 700 feet at that time.

If they're going to fly right through the landing pattern these helicopters need to be staying well below the glide envelope. This is crazy.

And if you watch the video all the way to the end, you see this same helicopter have another alert with yet another plane!

Another great set of comments:


@goaliemedic37
1 hour ago
You can hear the CA alarms in the background on the transmissions for both SWA and RPA and the controller says nothing. So my guess with the PSA that collided is the controllers are so used to heading the CA alarms they no longer act or respond on them. So when the CA alarms sounded for PSA and PAT25 they didn't think anything of it. It's called "alarm fatigue" and is a MAJOR problem in hospitals where staff hears alarms from devices all day so they ignore them and miss major incidents. Maybe it's time to revisits these helicopter routes in the same proximity of landing/departing commercial airliners.

@goaliemedic37
1 hour ago
@VASAviation Agreed, the []onus is on the PAT for maintain VisSep. But when something goes wrong, and a helo deviates off the route or above published altitude and sounds a CA, but the controllers are so used to hearing them they don't even react, that's where the problems can arise. Pretty sure this will be 100% on PAT for fault, but controllers shouldn't be so trained to ignore CAs that this can ever happen again.

Yep, I get the same fatigue. My wife is fixated on every turn signal that doesn't go off.

...probably a little more skeptical than folks in the industry who might be talking up their book (metaphorically) about where the breaking point actually is.

As a semi-regular flier (we take 2-4 trips per year), I'd rather not probe where the actual breaking point is. Thankyouverymuch.

Otherwise, you could end up with the Potomac crash being a routine thing.

But it does highlight to me that the folks who set this policy were probably thinking more about federal employees that sit in offices and draft regulations, rather than having in the front of their mind a federal employee like the folks who staff the FAA Academy.

Yes. Because, frankly, they're stupid. Very few people engage in that activity, as you indicated. There are armies of clerical workers shuffling paper (vital paper, but still paper). There is the staff of BP, the VA, the SS administration, the FAA, FDA, USDA, and on and on. I don't know the numbers, but I'd be surprised if even 1% of the workforce is about drawing up regulations.

In fact, I don't think they can draw up regulations without administration approval...the administration sets the tone, and the workers respond. Correct?

Some things to note here- notice how the helicopter's altimeter reading keeps jumping up and down.

I believe the altitude information VAS uses is rounded to the nearest 100 feet. So an aircraft flying a fairly steady 250 feet will see this figure bounce between 200 and 300 as the actual flight level varies just slightly. I think it's also the distance above ground rather than an absolute altitude above sea level. (I know Juan Browne - Blancolirio - talks often about having to adjust altitude figures for this difference.) If so, it could be varying simply because of variances in the terrain height.

But that climb to 700 feet is almost certainly an actual climb. DC isn't that far above sea level, and the Potomac is essentially at sea level.


One of the commenters on the YT video has it right. If this kind of thing is an everyday occurrence around Reagan National, we are just normalizing a very dangerous situation.

--Peter

I think the final report is going to say that Army pilots likely routinely busted altitude restrictions and the presence of helicopters on that flight path caused repeated RA/CA warnings. The warnings were likely so prevalent that controllers ignored them.

Lines of fault:
1. Allowing VFR helo flights along the Potomac that cross active runway glide paths
2. Repeated altitude restriction violations by Army pilots, causing multiple CA's
3. A sense of "accepted danger" by controllers, who placed too much trust in the Army pilots and didn't control their airspace tightly enough

Obvious step here is to ban those flights up the Potomac -or- at the very least make Army Aviation file an instrument flight plan. That way they don't get to freelance anymore and have to instructions from Reagan and the Potomac TRACON. A busted altitude ceiling then would generate 'Possible pilot deviations' and phone calls from the FAA to the Army.

From Slate's The Surge:

Donald Trump

When all you have is a DEI hammer …

Tragedy struck Washington Wednesday night as a military helicopter collided with a commercial plane, sending both into the Potomac River and leaving no survivors. At first, the coordinated response between the D.C., Virginia, and federal government responders and officeholders was efficient, with each respective party offering its condolences to the families as the recovery and investigative efforts continued. The president’s press team even initially put out a grown-up statement. And then there was our president himself. He first sent out a midnight post just asking questions about why the helicopter seemed to be so intent on flying into the plane. By midday Thursday, though, the White House had settled on a message more along the lines of Betcha the pilot was a Black guy? The administration’s assault on diversity, equity, and inclusion has been a passion of these opening weeks. Trump said in a press conference that it was “common sense” to speculate that the accident was the fault of DEI policies, though he had no information whatsoever to back this up. Trump then signed a whipped-up executive action super-extra directing the Federal Aviation Administration to get to the bottom of all this diversity business, now that it is, in Trump’s mind, crashing planes. In practicality, what he was doing was trying to shape a distracting narrative before it registered with people that in only the second week of Trump’s presidency, we’ve had the first commercial plane crash in the United States in 16 years.

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