The People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted large-scale military exercises that simulated a blockade of Taiwan from December 29-30. The exercise—named Justice Mission 2025—was the second exercise of its kind in 2025. The PLA began conducting blockade exercises around Taiwan with increasing frequency after Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024.

Justice Mission 2025 rehearsed operational elements of a campaign to isolate Taiwan while using the rehearsal to enhance the PRC’s political and psychological pressure on Taiwan and its allies. The exercise emphasized the use of naval and coast guard assets to enforce a blockade of Taiwan and rehearsed counter-intervention operations. The exercise did not involve PLA Navy aircraft carriers, suggesting that it was intended to practice only part of a larger blockade operation. The exercise reportedly included rehearsals of amphibious and air assault operations off Taiwan’s east coast as well as long-range rocket fire. PRC propaganda emphasized the blockade aspects of the exercise, but it may also have been intended to practice combining blockade/interdiction missions with operations that would support a decapitation strike or invasion of Taiwan. The PRC used the exercises as a coercive signal intended to weaken Taiwanese morale and deter Taiwanese leaders from policies that support Taiwanese sovereignty and self-defense.

The ISW-CDOT December 31 Special Report provides additional information and analysis on the exercises.

The US Department of Defense released the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR) on December 23. The report discussed major developments over 2024, focusing primarily on PLA technological developments and the Chinese posture toward Taiwan. The CMPR is a congressionally mandated annual review of observed military and security developments involving the PRC from the previous year. The 2025 CMPR detailed developments including PLA technological modernization, posture changes toward Taiwan and the South China Sea, and the impacts of widespread purges within the PLA and PRC defense industry.[1]

The PRC appeared to emphasize improving its ability to project power in the first and second island chains, integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities into existing systems, and incorporating lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. The CMPR reported that the PRC seeks to produce six additional aircraft carriers by 2035 for a total of nine. The PRC is also continuing to develop its sixth-generation aircraft and new airborne early warning and control aircraft capable of anti-jamming and passive detection. The CMPR also reported on the PLA Rocket Force’s new DF-27 intercontinental ballistic missile, which possesses a maximum range of 8,000 kilometers. This range would allow the PLA to strike anywhere in the Pacific as well as parts of the Northwestern continental United States. Additional areas of PRC investment reported include unmanned systems, AI-based technology, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, and biotechnology.

The CMPR also included a discussion of the PLA purges that occurred throughout 2024. These purges impacted every PLA service and major PRC defense industry entities. The report stated that the widespread purges likely indicate a lack of trust between CCP and PLA leadership, which may impact the PLA ability to reach its modernization goals. The report stated that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s decision to replace PLA Rocket Force leaders with individuals from the PLA Air Force and Navy likely indicates that Xi values party and personal loyalties over experience. The report postulates that the extent of PLA leadership turnover could also impact trust between newer recruits and PLA leadership, which would negatively impact overall PLA effectiveness.

(The Chinese military is discussed in some writings as if corruption is commonplace)

The CMPR placed a significant emphasis on the multi-domain PRC coercion of Taiwan. The report detailed PRC operations in the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains that seek to unify Taiwan with the PRC through a mix of “positive inducements and targeted pressure short of war.” The CMPR identifies four main campaigns for the PRC to unify with Taiwan: a short-of-war coercion campaign, a joint firepower strike campaign, a joint blockade campaign, and a joint island landing campaign. The CMPR identifies the joint island landing campaign as the most attractive option for the PRC, despite the risks posed, due to its decisiveness.

The CMPR characterizes PLA developments in 2024 as posing a significant threat to the United States, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific states. The United States, Japan, and Taiwan have all emphasized the importance of increased defense spending and an expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific to counter the PLA and malign PRC behavior.

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