No. of Recommendations: 2
The best way to avoid having to make that choice (with an economic gun to our head, as you and I both remember) is to maintain a strong regulatory oversight of such financial instruments. This was both the failure that led to the Great Recession of 2008, as well as what will lead to the likely collapse that will occur due to Trump’s rolling out the red carpet to Wall Streets creative construction of crypto derivatives.
Only this time, Trump and a few crypto bros will be major beneficiariesNot in 401(k)s. There's a reason why the most spicy investments aren't offered there:
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/552/24...LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008)
Docket No.
06-856
Granted:
June 18, 2007
Argued:
November 26, 2007
Decided:
February 20, 2008
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 06–856. Argued November 26, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
Petitioner, a participant in a defined contribution pension plan, alleged that the plan administrator’s failure to follow petitioner’s investment directions “depleted” his interest in the plan by approximately $150,000 and amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The District Court granted respondents judgment on the pleadings, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying on Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, the Circuit held that ERISA §502(a)(2) provides remedies only for entire plans, not for individuals.And the ruling was:
Held: Although §502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, it does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account. Section 502(a)(2) provides for suits to enforce the liability-creating provisions of §409, concerning breaches of fiduciary duties that harm plans. The principal statutory duties imposed by §409 relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of plan assets, with an eye toward ensuring that the benefits authorized by the plan are ultimately paid to plan participants. The misconduct that petitioner alleges falls squarely within that category, unlike the misconduct in Russell. There, the plaintiff received all of the benefits to which she was contractually entitled, but sought consequential damages arising from a delay in the processing of her claim. Russell’s emphasis on protecting the “entire plan” reflects the fact that the disability plan in Russell, as well as the typical pension plan at that time, promised participants a fixed benefit. Misconduct by such a plan’s administrators will not affect an individual’s entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire plan. For defined contribution plans, however, fiduciary misconduct need not threaten the entire plan’s solvency to reduce benefits below the amount that participants would otherwise receive. Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants or only to particular individuals, it creates the kind of harms that concerned §409’s draftsmen. Thus, Russell’s “entire plan” references, which accurately reflect §409’s operation in the defined benefit context, are beside the point in the defined contribution context. Pp. 4–8.And it looks like it was 9-0, so it wasn't particularly close.
