I think it was a huge mistake to put the deposits into these bonds at record low interest rates but at this price BAC looks pretty attractive...

I guess the bigger question is whether BAC is attractive even at a lower price : )
I have often been in the camp of those who don't really see many charms.

OK, there are some things going for them--
They're big, they won't go bust, they pay a pretty reliable dividend, and can be a destination for a huge amount of capital over very long time frames.
Unlike Wells Fargo, they have had the opportunity of some growth in total assets.
They have used some recent profits to reduce the share count by 22% in the last five years.
Those things may make them a good enough fit Berkshire's portfolio, in the perpetual bond view, but they aren't enough to excite me a lot.

I just don't see their history offering any particular reason to think they're very well run.
OK, they get some credit for improvement: averaging a very impressive 1.33% ROA in the 6 years 2016-2021 (admittedly a very benign stretch), compared to their old norm below 1% where their need to exist was in doubt.
But...they still only managed a double digit ROE four times within memory.
The dividend is all the way back up to 39% of its level in 2007. Is that news too old to be relevant?
I can certainly see why Berkshire bought the first 700m shares--it was the conversion of the warrants, and a price of $7.14 was pretty sweet. Even less when you count the interest on the preferred.
But the $6.6bn of open market purchases in 2018 at average $30.34 still perplex me, and the other $3bn worth later. Is it really that great, or just a place to park money when you have too many billions in cash?

Jim