No. of Recommendations: 3
But it makes it more difficult for the rest of the world to say to China, "You're wrong." For the rest of the world to marshall diplomatic and economic forces in opposition to China's ambitions in the region.
No it does not. The comparisons between Venezuela and Taiwan are silly. Is Taiwan hosting terrorist groups? Are they running drugs into China?
No and no.
Right now, the rules-based international order is that countries cannot use military force against other countries except in certain very limited circumstances - which circumstances do not include "they have resource we want or need" or "our national security would be better off if we had their territory instead of just our own." The idea is that if even the strong nations agree to be bound by those rules, then everyone has the protection of being more secure (though not absolutely certain) than in the absence of that rules-based system.
Right because China and Russia follow "the rules" already. To a T.
When you erode that, you don't change what China wants - or what it believes it's entitled to - but you do change the cost benefit equation to the use of military action, and you expand the collection of excuses that can be made for military action that China might determine (correctly or not) it can engage in without arousing the costly wrath of the international community. Again, these norms don't prevent China from using military force, but increase the cost of using direct military force relative to other efforts to try to obtain their ambitions.
The only cost/benefit analysis the Chines care about with respect to Taiwan is the following:
1. How much of Taiwan's economic assets survive the attack?
2. How much trade does China lose as a result of the attack?
3. How much of a benefit of capturing Taiwan vs. neutralizing it generate with respect to projecting military power outside the first island chain?
4. How expensive will it be in terms of ships and planes to neutralize/take over Taiwan?
Your "rules" don't make that list.
