Captkerosene mentioned on the Berkshire board:

Fairfax has a lot of float.

Yes. Let's compare Berkshire to Fairfax, as regards float. With Fairfax USD shares (FRFHF) climbing back to almost $1000/sh, as shareholders conclude that the Muddy Waters report contained little that should worry anyone, and with Berkshire B shares a whisker below $400, we now have the following numbers for Fairfax and Berkshire, using one-year old numbers for float for each company:

Berkshire float, year end 2022: $164b; market cap $859b; float leverage 19%;

Fairfax float, year end 2022: $31.2b; market cap $23.8b; float leverage 131%.

In other words, per $ invested, you get a lot more float with Fairfax than with Berkshire. This is a big advantage for Fairfax, if it can generate investment income from its float assets, which are now largely invested in treasury bonds with an average duration of 4y. The benefit of float for Berkshire, for the moment, is much less, since Berkshire traditionally invests almost all its float in very short-term treasuries, tantamount to cash. Berkshire would benefit enormously if the market dropped a lot, and allowed Berkshire to invest the cash in what Buffett likes best: fully-owned great companies and big stakes in great publicly traded companies. But if market prices remain high, and if interest rates remain far from zero, Fairfax may do better. Whereas if insurance ends up being a bad business, either because premiums drop again or because interest rates go way back down, Berkshire will do fine with its railroad, energy utilities and phone maker, but Fairfax would be sure to languish. They are very different businesses, and the sobriquet "Berkshire of the north" for Fairfax, although much less used in recent years as Fairfax's results have disappointed, was never very accurate to begin with. It is more like "mini-Berkshire insurance on steroids".

Regards, DTB